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BOARD REFORMS WITH A JAPANESE TWIST:
VIEWING THE JAPANESE BOARD OF
DIRECTORS WITH A DELAWARE LENS
Carlo Osi *
I. INTRODUCTION
The Japanese as a people have commonly been characterized as
consensus-builders, holding extreme regard for hierarchy, stable, 1 nonconfrontational, 2 and always one with the group (amae). 3 They adhere to
the notions of groupthink, familism, 4 and rarely deviate from the ideals and
structure of the group. Deviants are considered un-Japanese, social outcasts
and protruding nails that ought to be hammered down to blend into the
harmonious whole. 5 Culturally unchanged for centuries, it is unsurprising
that even within the Japanese boardroom directors carry the same traits and
advocate the same philosophies.

* LL.M. (University of Pennsylvania Law School, 2008); Certificate in Business and Public
Policy (Wharton School, 2008); LL.M. in International Economic and Business Law (Kyushu
University Faculty of Law, Japan, 2006); J.D./LL.B. (University of the Philippines, 2002). The
author thanks for their guidance Prof. Michael L. Wachter, William B. Johnson Professor of Law
and Economics, University of Pennsylvania Law School; and Delaware Court of Chancery Vice
Chancellor Leo E. Strine, Jr., Adjunct Professor of the University of Pennsylvania Law School.
The author similarly thanks Prof. Caslav Pejovic of the Faculty of Law of Kyushu University,
Japan. The author was a Mombusho-Young Leaders Program scholar at the Kyushu University in
2005–2006 where he finished his Master of Laws in International Economic & Business Law.
This article is the result of several years of study, research, and legal consultancy in Japan and the
author’s perspective is as a third-person observer admiring the beauty, complexity, mystique and
rigidity of Japanese corporate governance.
1. GREGORY JACKSON, RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF ECONOMY, TRADE AND INDUSTRY
(RIETI), CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY: WHAT JAPAN CAN LEARN FROM GERMANY (2002),
http://www.rieti.go.jp/en/miyakodayori/050.html (The hallmarks of Japanese corporate stability
were “concentrated ownership, no open market for corporate control, a central role for banks and
bank-based financing, strong participation of employees in corporate management, stable
employment and management strategy based on long-term organization building based on mutual
trust and cooperation among stakeholders.”).
2. This is contrary to the mistaken notion, notably based on Japan’s World War II status as an
aggressor, that the average Japanese is aggressive, violent, and confrontational.
3. BRUCE S. FEILER, LEARNING TO BOW: INSIDE THE HEART OF JAPAN 94 (2004) (“By
becoming one with the group . . . the Japanese are able to display a strength beyond the scope of
the individual.”) (quoting Takeo Doi).
4. The Japanese have a saying that “even if an extended family does not live together, parents
and grandparents should live near enough to carry over a bowl of hot soup.” Theodore Bestor &
Helen
Hardacre,
Contemporary
Japan:
Culture
and
Society,
http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/at_japan_soc/.
5. Thomas Dillon, Hitting the Nail on the Head, Feb. 28, 2004, THE JAPAN TIMES, available
at http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/fl20040228td.html. See also MARTIN J. GANNON,
UNDERSTANDING GLOBAL CULTURES: METAPHORICAL JOURNEYS THROUGH 28 NATIONS,
CLUSTERS OF NATIONS, AND CONTINENTS 37 (2004).
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Considered “the West’s exotic Other,” 6 behaviorally reserved and
egalitarian Japan has a corporate history and governance structure that has
fascinated and mystified scholars and practitioners alike for decades. Japan
follows a radically different corporate mold from the West and yet has
steadily increased its national wealth since the Second World War. 7 Its
values, belief system and business perspectives are almost totally opposite
that of the United States, but it remains the world’s second largest
economy. 8 Until the bubble burst of the early 1990s, the Japanese economy
had been stable and steadily growing for forty years. 9 Japanese corporate
practice differed immensely from the Anglo-American model because: (1)
it treated employees as family members; 10 (2) the corporation was run for
the benefit of all stakeholders; 11 (3) the keiretsu system of intertwined
shareholdings was pervasive; 12 (4) Main Banks (described below) were the
primary source of financing and not institutional investors; 13 (5) hostile
takeovers were uncommon; 14 and (6) mass layoffs did not generally
occur. 15 Yet, one thing the U.S. and Japan shared was highly ubiquitous
corporate scandals.
According to Christina Ahmadjian and Ariyoshi Okumura, post-war
corporate Japan was illuminated by a set of interrelated stakeholders—
labor, management, capital, buyers, suppliers, and the state. 16 The Japanese
corporation relied primarily on cross-shareholding ownership, whereby a
company owned a sizeable number of shares of other corporations within a
specific group or “keiretsu”, 17 thus enabling it to source out needed inputs
6. Jeffrey Levick, Japan in the U.S. Press: Bias and Stereotypes, July 2005, http://iisdb.stanford.edu/docs/121/press.pdf.
7. Economy Watch, Japan’s Economy, http://www.economywatch.com/world_economy/
japan/ (last visited Feb. 9, 2009).
8. Id.
9. See generally Zenichi Shishido, Japanese Corporate Governance: The Hidden Problems
of Corporate Law and Their Solutions, 25 DEL. J. CORP. L. 189 (2000) [hereinafter Shishido,
Japanese Corporate Governance].
10. TAKIE SUGIYAMA LEBRA, JAPANESE CULTURE AND BEHAVIOR: SELECTED READINGS 176
(1986).
11. See generally Luke Nottage, Japanese Corporate Governance at a Crossroads: Variation
in “Varieties of Capitalism”?, 27 N.C.J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 255 (2001).
12. See generally Ronald J. Gilson & Mark J. Roe, Understanding the Japanese Keiretsu:
Overlaps Between Corporate Governance and Industrial Organization, 102 YALE L.J. 871
(1993).
13. Ichiro Kobayashi, Practitioner Note: The Interaction Between Japanese Corporate
Governance and Relational Contract Practice, 2 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 269, 301–03 (2005).
14. Robert Neff, Japan: Land of the Hostile Takeover? (Int’l Edition), BUS. WK., Mar. 30,
2000, available at http://www.businessweek.com/2000/00_11/b3672182.htm.
15. Peter B. Doeringer, Christine Evans-Klock & David G. Terkla, Hybrids Or Hodgepodges?
Workplace Practices of Japanese and Domestic Startups in the United States, 51 IND. & LAB.
REL. REV. 171, 176–77 (1998).
16. Christina L. Ahmadjian & Ariyoshi Okumura, Corporate Governance in Japan, in
HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 130 (Christine A. Mallin, ed., 2006).
17. Keiretsu is the Japanese corporate model whereby companies and banks owned large
chunks of each other’s equity. It is comprised of networks of businesses whose financial base is a
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and resources quickly, but at the same time limiting its market. A single
bank that provided a majority of the funding (Main Bank) 18 was likely at
the center of the group and was deeply involved in all of the corporation’s
financial transactions, and was revered for this reason. 19 This Main Bank,
due to its dual role as lender and owner, had significant control over the
policy and operations of the company by deploying its employees as
corporate directors or officers. 20 This effectively resulted in stable
shareholding, passivity amongst institutional investors, and a relatively
weak capital market. 21
Stability also occurred in corporate leadership and amongst rank-andfile employees. In many corporations, the outgoing company president
normally handpicked his successor. 22 Significantly, a lifetime employment
system also emerged from a strong and unshaken belief that once
employed, a male employee would forever be connected with the same
company. 23 This practice is still firmly rooted in corporate culture despite
its applicability to a diminishing subset of the workforce. As late as October
2005, some sectors still felt that the labor force must be prioritized and that
retaining redundant employees fosters worker morale and instills loyalty. 24
To be sure, the “managerialist and employee-oriented cast to the Japanese
firm has not been fundamentally eroded.” 25
By the early 1990s, however, particularly with the unexpected burst of
the bubble 26 and the financial crisis afterwards, corporate Japan began the
major bank where such companies typically own stakes of each other as a natural defense against
untoward external threats and for mutual security. It is a quid pro quo arrangement: I hold your
shares, you hold mine and we will both be protected from any hostile takeover attempt.
18. The Main Bank relationship is the long-term and stable relationship between a corporation
and the bank that chiefly finances it.
19. Thayer Watkins, The Keiretsu of Japan, available at http://www.sjsu.edu/faculty/watkins/
keiretsu.htm (“The general structure of the keiretsu is an association of companies formed around
a bank. They cooperate with each other and own shares of each other’s stock.”).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Makoto Toda & William McCarty, Corporate Governance Changes in the Two Largest
Economies: What’s Happening in the U.S. and Japan?, 32 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 189,
205 (2005).
23. In general, companies practiced welfare corporatism and had a tendency to protect their
employees while seeking greater productivity from them, amounting to excessive work hours and
occasional work-related suicides. Japanese workers have also suffered from karoshi or death by
being overworked, and have also developed the socially acceptable habit of sleeping in public, on
trains to work, during meetings and in other social events.
24. SYMPOSIUM REPORT, BUILDING THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM OF THE 21ST CENTURY: AN
AGENDA FOR JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES 4 (Sept. 30 – Oct. 2, 2005),
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/pifs/pdfs/2005_jus_symposium_report.pdf.
25. Curtis J. Milhaupt, A Lost Decade for Japanese Corporate Governance Reform?: What
Changed, What Hasn’t, and Why 18 (Working Paper No. 202, Sept. 2004), available at
http://swopec.hhs.se/eijswp/papers/eijswp0202.pdf.
26. Japan Visitor, The Japanese Economy: A Look at the Post-Bubble Japanese Economy,
http://www.japanvisitor.com/index.php?cID=374&pID=768&cName=Travel%20Basics&p (last
visited Apr. 14, 2009) (“At the beginning of the 1990’s Japan was set to challenge the U.S. as the

328

BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.

[Vol. 3

long process of transformation. It began to open up to foreign ideas and
experimentation. It was forced to listen to the outside world. Analogous to
when U.S. Commodore Matthew Perry forced Japan to trade with the West
by threatening to use his mighty Ships in July 1853 near Edo (now
Tokyo), 27 Japan is gradually capitulating to Western-style corporate
governance. More foreign shareholders are entering the securities market
while aggressive mergers and hostile takeovers are slowly becoming
commonplace. 28 Shareholder activists—both Japanese and foreign-born—
are steadily chipping away at the deeply imbedded and unbending rigidities
of Japan’s traditional corporate world. 29 In the last few years, Japan has
seen the decreasing role of the Main Bank in corporate, financial and
shareholder affairs; 30 the prevalence of international or cross-border
transactions; and the gradual ebbing of the paternalistic lifetime
employment system. 31 The practice of instituting an overly bloated board
has been reconsidered and gradually altered. 32 For example, the Shareholder
Ombudsman was established in Osaka in 1996 to guard against bad
boardroom practices by instituting high profile derivative suits and hefty
settlements as deterrents. 33 Stronger CEOs have also emerged with the
decline of consensual decision-making of the board, and managers have
shifted their focus to greater returns on shareholder investments. Recently
world’s number one economy. It was the time of the Gucci loafers and two Rolex watches worn
on the one wrist . . . by 18 year-olds. The value of land was astronomical: it was calculated that
the Imperial Palace grounds in Tokyo were worth more than California in its entirety. Based on
land price, the real estate value of Japan was seven times that of the U.S. Then the bubble burst.”).
27. U.S. Department of State, The United States and the Opening to Japan, 1853,
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/dwe/86550.htm (last visited on Feb. 9, 2009).
28. See generally Curtis J. Milhaupt, In the Shadow of Delaware? The Rise of Hostile
Takeovers in Japan, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2171 (2005).
29. Examples of these shareholder activists are convicted insider-trader and former high
profile fund manager Yoshiaki Murakami, former Livedoor’s CEO Takafumi Horie, NY-based
Steel Partners, CA-based Dalton Investments, and London-based The Children’s Investment Fund
Management. See Joseph Chang, Shareholder Activism in Japan on the Rise, but Change will be
Difficult, ICIS, Nov. 2, 2007, http://www.icis.com/Articles/2007/11/05/9075289/shareholderactivism-in-japan-on-the-rise-but-change-will-be-difficult.html; see also Kanako Takahara,
Murakami: Investor Activist Turned Greenmailer?, THE JAPAN TIMES ONLINE, July 20, 2007,
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgibin/nb20070720a2.html; Takashi Betsui, Livedoor CEO, Other
Top Execs Arrested, CNET NEWS, Jan. 23, 2006, http://news.cnet.com/Livedoor-CEO,-other-topexecs-arrested/2100-1014_3-6029628.html; Christopher Hughes, More Perspiration than
Inspiration, Apr. 3, 2009, BREAKINGVIEWS.COM, http://www.breakingviews.com/2009/04/03/
Shareholder%20activism.aspx.
30. See generally Ronald J. Gilson, Reflections in a Distant Mirror: Japanese Corporate
Governance Through American Eyes, 1998 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 203 (1998).
31. Gregory Jackson, Employment Adjustment and Distributional Conflict in Japanese Firms,
in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN JAPAN: INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ORGANIZATIONAL
DIVERSITY 283 (Masahiko Aoki, Gregory Jackson, and Hideaki Miyajima, eds., 2007).
32. Matthew Senechal, Reforming the Japanese Commercial Code: A Step Towards an
American-style Executive Officer System in Japan?, 12 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y 535, 536 (2003).
33. Mark D. West, Why Shareholders Sue: The Evidence from Japan, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 351,
369–70 (2001) [hereinafter West, Why Shareholders Sue].
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instituted accounting regulations have engendered transparency and further
relaxed the once tight grip of cross-shareholding. 34 Thus, for almost two
decades, corporate governance has changed and evolved at an
unprecedented rate—though still slow in terms of U.S. standards—which is
something unexpected given the rigidity of Japanese society. Even former
Prime Minister Mori Yoshiro (2000–2001) remarked, “the system and the
ways of thinking which for 50 years have supported Japan’s astonishing
development have now become inappropriate for the world we live in.” 35
But not everything is changing. Despite the decrease in board size,
independent directors are still a rarity and executive compensation has yet
to achieve the same level as top-tier corporations in the United States.
Except for notable exceptions such as the Nissan-Renault corporation
headed by non-Japanese Carlos Ghosn, 36 Japanese corporations still have
not imbibed the American corporate value of downsizing for the sake of
shareholder interest. Even now, there are many “old guards” heading
Japanese boardrooms who see no reason to drastically change their
conventional “best practices” just to mirror U.S.-style governance. They
clamor for the suppression of homegrown shareholder activists like
Livedoor’s Takafumi Horie and Murakami Fund’s Yoshiaki Murakami, 37
and see hostile takeovers as destroying corporate “families” (by forcibly
segregating children from their parents) or as almost criminal behavior.
This article analyzes the evolution of the Japanese board of directors
and pinpoints the factors that obstruct its development. Part II explains in
detail the fundamental characteristics of Japanese corporate governance.
Part III traces the evolution of the board of directors from the Meiji
Restoration in the 1880s to the present day. Part IV tackles the question of
whether the Japanese model creates a monitoring or managing board. Next,
Part V explains who benefits from corporate management, while Part VI
describes the essential criteria for being selected/elected as a director. Part
VII illustrates the board reforms that have occurred. However, Part VIII
emphasizes the remaining pervasiveness of grey directors. Part IX
rationalizes that creeping, not sweeping or drastic, change is enveloping
Japan. The article concludes in Part X that despite the legislative reforms
and the optional adoption of the committee system, the Japanese board is
34. RALPH PAPRZYCKI & KYOJI FUKAO, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN JAPAN:
MULTINATIONALS’ ROLE IN GROWTH AND GLOBALIZATION 6, 65–66, 244–45 (2008).
35. Dr. A. Hernádi, Japan’s Responses to Globalization (June 6, 2003), available at
http://www.iem.ro/General/DATA/MRRomUng/AHERNADI.htm.
36. Carlos Ghosn is a Brazilian-born executive of Lebanese descent who trained in France. He
is largely credited for successfully turning around Japanese car manufacturer Nissan. He currently
is the CEO of the merged Nissan-Renault. See Executive Profile, Carlos Ghosn, BUS. WK.,
http://investing.businessweek.com/businessweek/research/stocks/people/person.asp?personId=752
502&symbol=NSANY.
37. Martin Fackler, Corporate Raider Arrested in Japan (June 5, 2006), available at
http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/06/05/business/insider.php.
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still not independent, but rather filled with insiders and grey directors. It
remains a managing board with an extremely hindered monitoring role.
Finally, this article prescribes remedies for Japanese corporate governance
that may be effective within the next decade or so, provided that reformists
increase in popularity and gradual changes are embraced by the public. The
unmistakable grey hues permeating Japanese boards must be replaced by
neutrally-toned independent directors, lest Japan becomes known as the
new Potemkin Village.
II. JAPANESE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AT A GLANCE
The Japanese post-war period of corporate governance spanned from
1945 to the late 1990s, with the bubble burst occurring in the very early
1990s. During that time, for which Japanese post-war corporate governance
has been typified as eccentric, slow to change, conservative and insular, 38
little changed within the corporate world. In what is informally known as
the J-Form, Japanese firms traditionally relied on monitoring by large
shareholders and banks. 39 Notably absent were hostile takeovers,
managerial incentives, mass layoffs, and corporate restructurings. Stable
shareholding, meager foreign shareholding, career or lifelong employment,
omnipresence of Main Banks and cross-shareholding were the consistent
corporate patterns during this period and they continue to a great degree
today. These features were attractive to some scholars, who argued that
Japanese-style corporate governance was a superior and viable alternative
to the governance mechanisms available in the West. 40
The Japanese system was and is dissimilar from the U.S. system in
other ways. As one scholar notes, the “Japanese system is usually
characterized as bank and relationship oriented and the U.S. system as
(stock) market oriented.” 41 During the post-war period, there was little
shareholder litigation, 42 no rationale for takeover activities, and no impetus
38. Ronald J. Gilson & Curtis J. Milhaupt, Choice as Regulatory Reform: The Case of
Japanese Corporate Governance, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 343, 343 (2005).
39. Masahiko Aoki, Toward an Economic Model of the Japanese Firm, 28 J. ECON. LIT. 1, 8
(1990).
40. Ushering the pre-bubble concept of Pax Japonica, which some have thought could replace
Pax America if not for the economic collapse in the early 1990s. See Etsuo Abe, What is
Corporate Governance? The Historical Implications, in THE DEVELOPMENT OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE IN JAPAN AND GREAT BRITAIN 1, 6 (Robert Fitzgerald & Etsuo Abe, eds., 2004).
See also Jean-Pierre Lehmann, Opening Up Japan, ASIA MEDIA, Oct. 19, 2004,
http://www.asiamedia.ucla.edu/article.asp?parentid=16056 (last visited on Apr. 14, 2009).
41. Steven N. Kaplan, Top Executive Rewards and Firm Performance: A Comparison of
Japan and the United States, 102 J. POL. ECON. 510, 510–11 (1994).
42. Less than twenty shareholder suits were filed between 1950 and 1990. See Mark D. West,
The Pricing of Shareholder Derivative Actions in Japan and the United States, 88 NW. U. L. REV.
1436, 1438 (1994). See also R. Daniel Kelemen & Eric C. Sibbitt, The Americanization of
Japanese Law, 23 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 269, 306–07 (2002) (“[T]he threat was so minimal that
directors and officers insurance, a standard insurance product in the United States, was not
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to challenge those sitting in the halls of corporate power. The residual
owners of the company were regarded with little importance. Moreover,
corporations systematically limited the duration of their annual shareholder
meetings to a little less than thirty minutes, ostensibly to prevent
shareholders from running wild. 43 The limitation was also designed to
forestall numerous questions or issues that could stir up controversy. 44 The
unique characteristics of Japanese corporate governance that existed during
the post-war period still play a vital role today.
A. CROSS-SHAREHOLDING
Cross-shareholding is a distinct feature of the corporate system and is
characterized by the web-like mutual shareholding structure prevalent
among companies that helped maintain stability in post-war Japan. The
development of this system has resulted in the following: (1) the illiquidity
of equity markets; (2) protection of businesses from hostile takeovers; (3)
passivity of shareholders; and (4) corporate management indifference to
shareholders’ interests. 45 Cross-shareholding is the clear result of groupism,
in which Japanese firms exhibit a predilection to “cluster themselves into
groupings of affiliated companies that extend a broad spectrum of
markets.” 46 According to Takahiro Yasui, it was originally developed in the
late 1940s and early 1950s with the purpose of raising capital while
preventing hostile acquisitions. 47 It has contributed to the relatively
concentrated ownership structure of Japanese companies. Presently, crossshareholding is unwinding as more foreign stockholders have bought into
the shares of Japanese companies. 48

introduced into Japan until 1990, and even then only for risks of exposure to lawsuits overseas.
Director’s and officer’s insurance for threats arising in Japan was not sold until 1994.”).
43. Some managers viewed shareholders as disturbances, if not a nuisance, who need not be
spoken to and should generally be ignored.
44. As to be explained later, management used Yakuza gangsters and their own employees
through irrepressible clapping sessions to suppress legitimate shareholder voice during
shareholder meetings. See Shareholders Meetings: Big Police Presence Checks ‘Sokaiya’, THE
JAPAN TIMES ONLINE, June 30, 2000, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20000630a4.html
[hereinafter Shareholders Meetings]; see also discussion supra Part II.F.
45. Toru
Umeda,
Corporate
Governance
Reforms
in
Japan,
http://www.icac.org.hk/ICAC/ACTIVITIES/leader/ppt/toru_e.ppt (last visited Apr. 14, 2009).
46. Michael L. Gerlach, Twilight of the Keiretsu? A Critical Assessment, in COMPARATIVE
LAW: LAW AND THE LEGAL PROCESS IN JAPAN 379–81 (Kenneth L. Port ed., 1996).
47. Takahiro Yasui, Corporate Governance in Japan, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN ASIA:
A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 129 (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
[OECD] ed., 2001).
48. See generally INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, JAPAN: SELECTED ISSUES (2008),
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2008/cr08254.pdf.
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B. THE MAIN BANK SYSTEM
A Main Bank is a bank that provides loans to a company and at the
same time holds that company’s stock. 49 A typical Japanese company
develops a long-term relationship with a Main Bank and depends on it for
support and financing. 50 It is the company’s largest creditor and often its
largest shareholder. 51 It normally holds the largest exposure, among private
financial institutions, of loans made to a firm. 52 As it also holds equity, it is
expected to monitor the company but to intervene only when things go
wrong. 53 Since a Main Bank intervenes only when the company is
distressed, this has been described as “contingent governance”; the board
enjoys a high degree of autonomy in normal times but will defer to the
Main Bank in abnormal situations. 54
Banks gladly serve as Main Banks because their client-companies are
certain to utilize them for transactional purposes, earning the banks fees and
profits through deposits, a monopoly in employees’ salary accounts, and
interest rates. 55 To ensure a healthy return on Main Bank investments,
current or former bank employees are placed in key managerial positions or
on the boards of directors of these firms. 56 Perhaps even more important is
the role of the Main Bank when one of its keiretsu members becomes
financially distressed; because the Main Bank has loan and equity
exposures, it will often come to the company’s rescue. 57 Main Banks have
even dabbled in the negotiations of a company’s debts and its possible
restructuring. 58 This results in rampant inefficiency, where regularly failing
companies are kept afloat due to the Main Bank’s intervention and
patriarchy. 59 They are treated like lost spoiled children whose parents
49. Main Banks not only finance the companies, but they also own them in part by buying into
these companies, particularly if they belong to the same keiretsu. They also serve as underwriters
of bond issues. See Ahmadjian & Okumura, supra note 16, at 130–31.
50. See id.
51. See Mark J. Loewenstein, What Can We Learn From Foreign Systems?: Stakeholder
Protection in Germany and Japan, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1673, 1687 (2002).
52. Id.
53. MASAHIKO AOKI & HUGH T. PATRICK, THE JAPANESE MAIN BANK SYSTEM: ITS
RELEVANCE FOR DEVELOPING AND TRANSFORMING ECONOMIES 3–5 (1994). Main Banks
naturally acted as monitors of the corporations they owned because they needed to guarantee that
the funds lent were invested well or attained their original purpose.
54. See Yasui, supra note 47, at 123–24 (“The governance structure of Japanese corporations
is often characterised as ‘contingent governance’ in which company insiders retain effective
control of management as long as the firm performs well, but once performance deteriorates, the
control is taken away and they are subject to severe sanctions such as the forced liquidation of the
corporation.”).
55. See generally Takeo Hoshi, Evolution of the Main Bank System in Japan, in BANKING IN
JAPAN 159–85 (William M. Tsutsui, ed., 1999).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
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stubbornly believe that a turnaround is forthcoming; hence, the Main
Bank’s monitoring and disciplining role. 60
In the late 1980s, banks and other financial institutions held about 40%
of Japanese publicly listed shares. 61 Although it was illegal for any single
bank to hold a stake in a company greater than 5%, banks coordinated with
closely affiliated banking institutions, insurance companies and other
financial companies to sidestep the law. 62 The law was easily circumvented
to perpetually put companies in the hands of a Main Bank or at least a
friendly third party. These Main Banks were also boosted by the
coordinated assistance and protection provided by the Ministry of Finance,
which made certain that poor performers were ably supported. Since the
Ministry of Finance had their support, banks frequently took high lending
risks with their clients. 63 This, among other interrelated reasons, would later
take down some of the behemoth Main Banks.
Main Banks have gradually been replaced by a more capital marketdependent system. 64 The Main Bank system “has gradually become
incompatible with the changing economic environment.” 65 However, Main
Banks have not ceased being the main financing core of keiretsu
companies. 66 “It would be more accurate to suggest that the main banks
have shifted from performing their insurance function through active
rescues to relying on passive life-support operations.” 67 While there is a
general unwinding of the old Main Banks, some have just merged with
other banks to form “megabanks” 68 that continue to play a key, though
often no longer dominating role in the affairs of companies. Some of the
Main Banks have gone out of business, but many still exist and continue to
60. See Yasui, supra note 47, at 123, 131–32.
61. Sanford M. Jacoby, Corporate Governance in Comparative Perspective: Prospects for

Convergence, 22 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 5, 16–17 (2000).
62. Mark J. Roe, Some Differences in Corporate Structure in Germany, Japan, and the United
States, 102 YALE L.J. 1927, 1939–41 (1993).
63. See generally Gregory D. Ruback, Master of Puppets: How Japan’s Ministry of Finance
Orchestrates its Own Reformation, 22 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 185 (1998).
64. MAMIKO YOKOI-ARAI, FINANCIAL STABILITY ISSUES: THE CASE OF EAST ASIA 117–19
(2002).
65. Toshihiko Fukui, Governor, Bank of Japan, Toward the Reform of Corporate Finance in
Japan, Keynote Speech at the JSLA Symposium on “New Corporate Finance to Revitalize Japan,”
in
Tokyo,
Japan
(Nov.
17,
2003),
available
at
http://www.boj.or.jp/en/type/press/koen/ko0312e.htm.
66. STEVEN KENT VOGEL, JAPAN REMODELED: HOW GOVERNMENT AND INDUSTRY ARE
REFORMING JAPANESE CAPITALISM 127–129 (2006).
67. Id. at 128.
68. Sumitomo Bank and Mitsui Bank merged in 2001 to become the Sumitomo Mitsui
Banking Corporation; Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi and UFJ merged in 2004 to become the world’s
largest bank; Sanwa Bank later became part of the Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ. See Akiko
Kashiwagi & Peter S. Goodman, Japan Merger Creates World’s Largest Bank, WASHINGTON
POST, July 16, 2004, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A54352-2004Jul16.html.
See also Bank-merger Mania: And Then There were Five?, ASIA TIMES ONLINE, Aug. 27, 1999,
available at http://www.atimes.com/editor/AH27Ba01.html.
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perform lending and financing functions. 69 They are reinventing
themselves, “are rushing to unwind their cross-shareholdings,” 70 and
continue to play key roles, albeit more subdued and less interventionist
ones. 71
The Japanese have learned their lessons well on the failures of the Main
Bank system, 72 though it took decades, a lot of flack from the public, and
necessitated a very firm government hand. After the bubble burst in the
early 1990s and the decade-long economic stagnation, the Main Bank
system was blamed and solutions were formulated. 73 While the Main Banks
were correctly identified as the source of the problem, the central solution
of various Japanese administrations in the 1990s was to bail out banks,
lower interest rates, and offer massive fiscal stimulus packages among other
things. 74 All of these plans failed in Japan, as they wasted large amounts of
capital in an attempt to prop up a flawed banking system without making
any real substantive changes. 75 In the late 1990s, Japanese banks still kept
loans extended to “zombie” companies on their balance sheets instead of
disclosing them and writing them off. 76
In 2003, after more than a decade of stagnation, Japan’s government,
headed by reformist Junichiro Koizumi, instituted a set of complete and
“merciless audits” 77 of the banking system under the so-called Takenaka
Plan. Heizo Takenaka, who led the government’s financial reforms, brought
to light the real extent of the banking crisis. With a firm, unrelenting
approach, the banks finally disclosed and wrote off their bad loans after
three years. In the end, the government nationalized one big bank, offended
many bank shareholders, and allowed some banks to collapse and fail under
69. VOGEL, supra note 66, at 127–29.
70. See Fukui, supra note 65. “Cross-shareholdings may have a serious and unpredictable

impact on banks’ business given their limited capital bases. In this sense, banks’ reductions of
cross-shareholdings represent an attempt to restore themselves to financial soundness. At the same
time, I believe that, having freed their capital from stock price volatility, they will be able to
increase their extension of loans to firms.” Id.
71. Id. “The traditional framework for corporate financing in Japan worked well in the economic
environment and structures of the past, which explains why it will take a substantial amount of
effort and energy to change its direction.” Id.
72. Hugh T. Patrick, The Relevance of Japanese Finance and Its Main Bank System, in THE
JAPANESE MAIN BANK SYSTEM: ITS RELEVANCE FOR DEVELOPING AND TRANSFORMING
ECONOMIES 353–408 (Masahiko Aoki and Hugh T. Patrick, eds., 1994).
73. See Hiroko Tabuchi, Japan sees U.S. Repeating its Mistakes on Bank Plan,
INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, Feb. 13, 2009, at 1.
74. Id. There are clearly similarities between the Japanese banking crisis of the 1990s and the
United States’ present banking crisis. A plethora of questions on the United States’ response to the
crisis thus comes into mind: Are the Japanese solutions to their own banking problems applicable
to the United States? See Anthony Randazzo, Return of the Living Dead: What the U.S. Can Learn
from Japan’s Failed Experiment with “Zombie Businesses”, REASONONLINE.COM, Dec. 17, 2008,
http://www.reason.com/news/show/130626.html.
75. See Tabuchi, supra note 73.
76. Id.
77. Id.
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their own weight. 78 It is believed that “was a turning point in the banking
crisis” because “[a]fter that, markets finally trusted the banks again.” 79
C. LIFELONG EMPLOYMENT AND THE SENIORITY WAGE SYSTEM
Lifelong or career-long employment, which is applicable only to males,
has several key elements. First, the individual is hired directly from school
instead of being hired in the open market. 80 Second, the individual is hired
based on his general characteristics and abilities, rather than for a
specialized or particular skill. 81 Third, he is expected to remain in the
company for the length of his career, and in return, he can expect not to be
fired or discharged. 82 Fourth, an employee chooses a company, not a
profession. An employee will ordinarily refuse to job hop. 83 Career
employment acts as a social safety net, covering everything from health
care to housing loans to retirement funds. 84
Under the Seniority-Wage System, a worker’s salary is not based on his
performance, but on the length of his service to the company. 85 Employees
are generally paid a minimally sufficient amount from the start of their
careers until they reach 50. When they turn 50, their salaries grow very
quickly. By the mandatory retirement age of 60 or 65 (depending on the
corporation), they get a large bonus plus a reliable pension that they can use
in their old age. 86 The practices of career employment and seniority wages
are waning 87 and have become difficult to sustain in recent years. 88
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Linda N. Edwards, Equal Employment Opportunity in Japan: A View from the West, 41

INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 240, 244 (1988).
81. See generally Daniel H. Foote, Judicial Creation of Norms in Japanese Labor Law:
Activism in the Service of—Stability?, 43 UCLA L. REV. 635, 651–60 (1996).
82. JAMES ABBEGLEN AND GEORGE STALK, JR., KAISHA: THE JAPANESE CORPORATION 183–
88, 191–92, 194–206 (1985).
83. Sanford M. Jacoby, Business and Society in Japan and the United States, 43 BRITISH J.
IND. REL. 4 (Dec. 2005), available at http://www.anderson.ucla.edu/documents/areas/fac/hrob/
BJIRWeb.pdf.
84. Lifelong employment was once the Japanese dream. Men could live their lives out in a
company with little or no fear of retrenchment or termination without cause. The reality of the
world economy nowadays focuses sharply on reduced costs, a leaner yet meaner work force,
efficient management and better output. As Japan is continuously struggling to remain the second
largest economy, this may be the end of the dream for the Japanese salary man (sarariman),
despite being once the paragon of contemporary Japan.
85. Kathleen B. O’Neill, Industrial Relations in Korea: Will Korea Become Another Japan?,
12 COMP. LAB. L. 360, 382 (1991).
86. Ann R. Klee, Worker Participation in Japan: The Temporary Employee and Enterprise
Unionism, 7 COMP. LAB. L. 365, 375–77 (1986).
87. HIROYUKI FUJIMURA ET AL., CHANGING CORPORATE SOCIETY AND FUTURE
CHALLENGES FOR COMPANIES, INDIVIDUALS, AND SOCIETY: TOWARD AN EMPLOYMENT
FOCUSED SOCIETY (2003), http://www.jil.go.jp/english/reports/documents/jilpt-research/nol3.pdf.
88. RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF ECONOMY, TRADE AND INDUSTRY, IAA, PRESCRIPTION FOR A
BETTER JAPAN: RIETI FEATURED FELLOW RONALD DORE RIETI REPORT NO. 023, May 29,
2003, http://www.rieti.go.jp/en/rieti_report/023.html (“Lifelong employment is collapsing, and
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D. BOARD OF DIRECTORS
Directors in Japan are commonly classified as either insiders or
outsiders; outside directors are further classified as either grey or
independent. Directors tend to be lethargic, because independent outside
directors are kept in extremely small numbers. There is little board control
over the actions and decisions of the company president. Board decisions
are likely to be rubber-stamped, 89 and board meetings are infrequent—all of
which results in a rather dysfunctional governance system. Boards likewise
tend to be very large, at least when compared to Western standards. For
example, as recently as 1990, Sony Corporation’s board had thirty-six
directors (which increased to thirty-eight in 1997) 90 while Nippon Steel had
forty-two. 91 Many of these directors were insiders; former corporate
executives or employees who were promoted to director status.
E. GOVERNMENT-BUSINESS HEGEMONY
Strong government-business ties exist in corporate Japan, allowing for a
cozy business relationship between bureaucrats—with strong emphasis on
public works ministry bureaucrats—and businessmen. Government
agencies and businesses form a symbiotic relationship in which they
exchange favors and business deals. 92 Though not necessarily implying
corruption, a government bureaucrat working closely with some highmoneyed industries can be assured that upon his retirement from
government, a comfy executive position in a company with the sought-after
perquisites awaits him—something like an “Old Boy” network. 93 Convoy
Capitalism—the intervention by the Ministry of Finance and the Bank of
Japan in dying, inefficient or “zombie” banks and borrowers by bleeding
successful Japanese corporations, also plays a key role in the governmentbusiness hegemony. 94
F. THE SOKAIYA NUISANCE
Beyond being a country highly concerned with formal courtesies and
subtleties, Japan is, on the other extreme, well-known for organized crime.
committing to just one company is becoming difficult . . . Japan really is the ‘unsteady
archipelago.’”).
89. Ronald Dore, Papers on Employees and Corporate Governance, 22 COMP. LAB. L. &
POL’Y J. 159, 164 (2000).
90. See Curtis J. Milhaupt, Creative Norm Destruction: The Evolution of Nonlegal Rules in
Japanese Corporate Governance, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2083, 2117 (2001) [hereinafter Milhaupt,
Creative Norm Destruction].
91. Ahmadjian & Okumura, supra note 16, at 132.
92. See generally Ulrike Schaede, The “Old Boy” Network and Government-Business
Relationships in Japan, 21 J. OF JAP. STUDIES 293 (1995).
93. Id.
94. The International Economy, Will “Convoy Capitalism” Sink Japan?, Nov. 2000,
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2633/is_6_14/ai_68145871.
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Yakuza organizations have ruled the country for a considerable period. 95
They sprung from feudal origins, and consisted of the original protectors of
the village, masterless samurais (ronin), town servants, peddlers and even
excessive gamblers. 96 In the corporate world, they have been reincarnated.
Sôkaiya, literally meaning “general meeting operators,” is a unique
Japanese form of extortion practiced by the Yakuza and peddled in the
corporate halls. The Sôkaiya are gangster corporate racketeers. They have
also been known as “‘financial racketeers,’ ‘general meeting mongers,’
‘black gentlemen in the shadow[s],’ and ‘rent-a-thugs.’” 97 Their modus
operandi is simple: they deploy members or operatives during a
stockholders’ meeting and employ an agenda that depends on whether they
have been paid off. Their presence effectively frightens stockholders from
coming forward with their proposals or actively pushing for reforms. They
act as deterrents to stockholders otherwise resolved to participate in the
decision-making process, and ensure that the meeting will run smoothly.
These corporate racketeers use threats, intimidation and other scare tactics
to keep the meetings short, empty, ritualistic and meaningless. 98
The Yakuza achieve their ends by systematically and illegally obtaining
embarrassing evidence on company leaders, blackmailing them in exchange
for keeping such disparaging information from the public or the
shareholders. 99 Such information may be about tax evasion, mistresses, the
lack of safety guidelines in their plants, or other unsavory information about
the company or its officers. 100 Many corporations have used racketeers to
keep shareholder meetings brief and infrequent, occurring once a year for
only twenty to thirty minutes. Anything beyond that is considered long and
unacceptable. The Sôkaiya have also been paid to scare away shareholder
activists or ordinary stockholders from raising any issues, 101 no matter how
95. Christopher Altman, Japanese Yakuza: History and Cultural Development,
http://altman.casimirinstitute.net/yakuza.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2009).
96. Anthony
Bruno,
The
Yakuza:
Origins
and
Traditions,
http://www.trutv.com/library/crime/gangsters_outlaws/gang/yakuza/1.html (last visited Feb. 17,
2009).
97. D. KAPLAN AND A. DUBRO, YAKUZA: THE EXPLOSIVE ACCOUNT OF JAPAN’S CRIMINAL
UNDERWORLD 169–73 (1986).
98. See Shareholders Meetings, supra note 44.
99. In the last ten years, some company officials were found guilty of paying off the gangsters
to keep secret certain sensitive information on directors or officers that would likely cause
embarrassment and social humiliation in front of their own employees. See Brian Bremner &
Emily Thornton, BLACKMAIL! A Rash of Scandals and a Government Crackdown are Showing
how Mob-linked Investors—The Sokaiya—Prey on some of Japan’s Biggest Companies. Can
Business Break Free? (1997), available at http://www.calbaptist.edu/dskubik/scandal.htm.
100. See id.
101. See, e.g., Japan v. Hobo, 23 Keishu 1359, SUP. CT., P.B., Oct. 16, 1969. In the same case
but during the trial at the lower court (Tokyo District Court), a Sokaiya was described “as one who
holds a few shares of stock in many companies, and at the request of one of these companies,
professionally attends the general meetings of that company, for the express purpose of assisting
the company in holding the meeting and passing all company-proposed resolutions.” 7 Kakeishu
1712 (Tokyo Dist. Ct., Aug. 27, 1965).
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relevant or material to the company. They have likewise taken seemingly
legitimate forms by becoming corporate insiders, company consultants and
advisers. 102 In essence, however, the Sôkaiya attend meetings for three
reasons: for corporate blackmail, to manage shareholder meetings, and to
use violence if necessary. 103
G. THE GRADUAL DEMISE OF, AND RECENT CHANGES IN,
TRADITIONAL JAPANESE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
The burst of the otherwise stable bubble economy signaled the
diminution, if not the eventual demise, of these key elements of Japanese
corporate governance. Japan’s traditional strengths that led to its 40-year
stability would turn out to be its critical weaknesses. After the bubble burst,
there was almost a decade-and-a-half-long regression of the economy,
highlighted by low economic growth, job insecurity, 104 unexpected
bankruptcies, bad loans, national anxiety, and a shift of industrial
operations, primarily to China. 105
During these times, Japanese companies shifted from bank-based
financing to capital market financing, resulting in a smaller percentage of
bank debts and the eventual disappearance of the Main Bank
stranglehold. 106 Companies were able to raise more funds from places like
London and New York than from Tokyo. 107 As a result, cross-shareholding
and the keiretsu system gave way to greater foreign equity ownership.
Banks, experiencing liquidity problems stemming from the failure of
Japanese companies to repay their loans, and from revisions in accounting
regulations mandating that shares be reported at market, needed to sell most
of their shares. Foreign investors who wanted to get a foothold in imperial
Japan bought the shares peddled by the banks. 108 Foreign share ownership
quickly rose from 6% in 1992 to a staggering 18% in 2003, and to 28% in
2007. 109 Meanwhile, shareholding by financial institutions dropped to
102. CURTIS J. MILHAUPT & MARK D. WEST, ECONOMIC ORGANIZATIONS AND CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE IN JAPAN: THE IMPACT OF FORMAL AND INFORMAL RULES 112 (2004).
103. Id. at 109–13 (2004).
104. Suvendrini Kakuchi, Japan: Amid Shrinking Paychecks, Signs of the ‘New Worker’, ASIA
TIMES ONLINE, Dec. 24, 1999, available at http://www.atimes.com/japan-econ/AL24Dh01.html.
105. Irene M. Kunii, Alysha Webb & Dexter Roberts, In Japan, “China Is Sexy”, BUS. WK.,
Oct. 7, 2002, available at http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/02_40/b3802154.htm.
106. See generally Arikawa, Yasuhiro & Miyajima, Hideaki, Relationship Banking in post
Bubble Japan: Co-existence of Soft-and Hard Budget Constraint (Mar. 2005), RIETI,
http://www.rieti.go.jp/jp/publications/dp/05e015.pdf.
107. ARTHUR ALEXANDER, THE ARC OF JAPAN’S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 100–102 (2008).
108. They were mostly U.S. or U.K. institutional investors.
109. Foreign investments have been increasing steadily, with 2003–2004 showing 21.8% of the
stocks to be foreign-owned; 23.7% in 2004–2005; and at 26.7% as of 2005–2006. As of October
2005, M&A activities account for $171B, up over 84% compared to the figures during the same
month in 2004, or about 20% of the M&A volume in North America in 2006. See generally
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, supra note 48.
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approximately 35% in 2002. 110 Shareholding by commercial banks, or
specifically Main Banks, declined to just 6% in 2004 from 16% in 1992. 111
Corporate share ownership decreased to just 24% by 2004. 112
In 2006, one scholar remarked, “There is a shift underway in Japan
about the role of shareholders and the importance of getting return on
equity . . . one of the beneficial outcomes is a heightened awareness on the
part of CEOs, investors and employees of the radical changes that are
occurring in the Japanese investment environment.” 113 This is quite
interesting considering that in 1983—during the time when the United
States was experiencing an influx of mergers and acquisitions, when the
U.S. equity base was increasingly held by institutional investors, and when
Martin Lipton of the renowned New York firm Wachtell Lipton Rosen &
Katz LLP was developing his shareholder rights plan or the “poison pill”—
it was said that:
In most listed companies in Japan, a sizeable portion of the stock remains
permanently in ‘safe’ hands, thus assuring continued control by
management. Shareholdings are fragmented between ‘insiders’ and
‘outsiders.’ Insiders are small circles of executives and financiers often
connected with the issuer’s enterprise group. Outsiders consist primarily
of individual investors, and to a lesser degree, of investment advisory
firms, insurance companies, banks or other groups and foreign firms.
Outsiders occupy a position analogous to second-class creditors; they
receive dividends, smaller but more consistent than in the U.S., and capital
gain treatment when they sell, but have no real voice over the way
corporate affairs are conducted. The insiders are in charge, not by virtue of
their position as shareholders, but as a product of the multiplicity of their
roles in the firm; they are creditors, shareholders, lifetime employees,
management and business partners. 114

The contrast between this pronouncement about Japan in 1983 and the
gradual changes that have appeared in the last few years only confirm the
fact that change can and will occur even in such a highly traditional and
conservative society, though it will take much time and persuasion. Belated
110. Katsumasa Suzuki, Future Prospects of Takeovers in Japan Analyzed from the View of
Share-ownership Structures and Laws in Comparison with the United States and the European
Union, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 777, 815–16 (2004).
111. See Dan W. Puchniak, The Japanization of American Corporate Governance, 9 ASIANPACIFIC L. & POL’Y J. 7, 61. See generally Richard Schwindt & Devin McDaniels, Competition
Policy, Capacity Building, and Selective Adaptation: Lessons from Japan’s Experience, 7 WASH.
U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 35, 81–84 (2008).
112. Knowledge@Wharton, How Two Young Japanese Internet Companies Are Shaking Up
Corporate Governance in Japan, Feb. 8, 2006,
http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/
article.cfm?articleid=1348.
113. Knowledge@Wharton, Radical Change in the Investment World, Feb. 3, 2006,
http://www.whartonsp.com/articles/article.asp?p=437458&seqNum=2&rl=1.
114. Christopher Lee Heftel, Corporate Governance in Japan: The Position of Shareholders in
Publicly Held Corporation, 5 U. HAWAII L. REV. 135 152–65 (1983).
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as they were, the Western-style changes in corporate governance were
direly needed for Japan to maintain its position as the world’s second
largest economy.
III. THE EVOLUTION OF THE JAPANESE BOARD OF
DIRECTORS 115
The evolution of the present-day Japanese board of directors can be
traced all the way back to the 1870s Meiji Restoration 116 when authority
was centrally reposed to the Emperor. 117 Around that time, the state decided
it would develop its industrial capabilities to catch up, if not match, the
military strength of European and American colonial powers. 118 It wanted
to transform Japan from a peasant economy into an industrial power by
introducing Western technology. 119 Fearful of possible occupation, yet
harboring its own geographic ambitions, Japan favored companies that were
directly involved in warfare. 120 The state played a critical monitoring role to
ensure that these companies were well run, developed good technology,
were subsidized if needed, and delivered the required supplies to the
government. 121 The interventionist-minded state coordinated the business
and affairs of vast enterprises, especially in times of crisis. 122
The powerful men behind the restored Meiji government not only
wanted to assure their hold to power but also, more importantly, feared
Western subjugation. They knew Japan was too economically weak and
agriculturally dependent to compete with Europe and the United States, so
the country would need to co-opt Western concepts and laws. Under this
theme, in 1877, the government invited German scholar and professor
Hermann Roesler to serve as legal adviser to the Foreign Ministry in
Tokyo. 123 He began by revising Japan’s treaty with Korea. 124 By April
115. For further discussion, see ALEXANDER, supra note 107, at 1–7, 12–14, 36–38, 62–64, 68–
69, 72–73, 81–82, 92–99.
116. The Restoration began in 1868.
117. Columbia University, East Asian Curriculum Project, The Meiji Restoration and
Modernization:
Japan
Answers
the
Challenge
of
the
Western
World,
http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/japan/japanworkbook/modernhist/meiji.html (last visited Feb. 17,
2009).
118. Id.
119. Franklin A. Gevurtz, The European Origins and the Spread of the Corporate Board of
Directors, 33 STETSON L. REV. 925, 937 (2004).
120. Leading to Japan’s defeat of China in the 1894-95 war and Russia in the 1904–05 war. See
generally Hoshimi Uchida, Short History of the Japanese Technology, 1995,
http://www.ied.co.jp/isan/sangyo-isan/JS7-history.htm#_Toc442163148.
121. JANET HUNTER, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN MEIJI JAPAN: IMAGE AND REALITY 8 (2005),
http://www.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/cirje/research/workshops/papers/hunter/hunter2.pdf.
122. Id. at 8–9.
123. Philip Mitchell, The Japanese Commercial Code of 1890, and its Reception in the First
Two Sessions of the Imperial Diet, 1890-1, in JAPAN’S EARLY PARLIAMENTS, 1890–1905:
STRUCTURE, ISSUES & TRENDS 196, 201 (Andrew Fraser, R.H.P. Mason, & Philip Mitchell, eds.,
1995).
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1881, he began drafting the country’s commercial code. 125 Little is known
of his methodology on drafting the code except that he typically worked
alone and “undertook a worldwide study of commercial law.” 126 Almost
three years after he started, he submitted a completed draft to the
government consisting of 1,133 articles divided into four books on such
topics as “Commerce . . . , Maritime Commerce, Bankruptcy, and
Commercial Litigation.” 127 Based largely on the German code and practice,
the commercial code included governance provisions that were antishareholder 128 in nature. It was implemented in 1899, 129 and subsequently
revised many times thereafter.
In the late 1890s and early 1900s, businesses (military, industrial and
agricultural) 130 did not have a formalized “board of directors” as we know it
today—they were either loosely organized or boards were comprised
entirely of government officials and appointees. 131 These businesses were
mainly composed of individual entrepreneurs, groups or families who
managed thousands of workers, and were supervised and financed by the
state through its organs. 132 It is even said that some members of the
Samurai, who by then were fading into obsolescence, went into business
and secured government contracts. 133 These businesses, known as joint
stock companies, were established largely as joint ventures between
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id. at 201.
Id. at 202.
Id.
Id.
Makoto Yazawa, The Legal Structure for Corporate Enterprise: Shareholder-Management
Relations Under Japanese Law, in LAW IN JAPAN: THE LEGAL ORDER IN A CHANGING SOCIETY
547 (Arthur Taylor von Mehren, ed. 1963).
129. Shōhō (Commercial Code), Law No. 48 of 1899.
130. Other than military supply companies, there were also joint stock companies in railways,
cotton spinning and banks. See generally KENICHI OHNO, EAST ASIAN GROWTH AND JAPANESE
AID POLICY 37–59 (2003). This book is a collection of Mr. Ohno’s essays. The specific article in
the book that deals with the subject matter is entitled The Industrialization and Global Integration
of Meiji Japan, found in Chapter 5.
131. “Boards” were composed of the bosses of investor groups who were mostly part-time
directors, did not have any technical skills or knowledge in the business, and sat on the board
exclusively to ensure return on investment. But even at that time, there were company share
disputes, shareholder meetings, dividends and inter-director politics. “Boards” were also
composed of government ministry officials, elected governors or bank officials. See R.H. Myers,
Japanese Imperialism in Manchuria: The South Manchuria Railway Company, 1906-1933, in 4
MEIJI JAPAN: POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL HISTORY, 1868–1912, at 21, 23–25 (Peter
Francis Kornicki, ed., 1998).
132. See generally Avram Agov, Meiji Japan, 1868-1911: Government’s Role in Economic
Growth
and
the
Rise
of
Mitsui
Zaibatsu,
MEDIA
TIMES
REVIEW,
http://www.mediatimesreview.com/february05/meiji.php (last visited Feb. 17, 2009). See also
Shunsuke Sumikawa, The Meiji Restoration: Roots of Modern Japan (Mar. 29, 1999),
(unpublished research paper, Lehigh University), http://www.lehigh.edu/~rfw1/courses/1999/
spring/ir163/Papers/pdf/shs3.pdf.
133. JOHN C. BECK & MARTHA N. BECK, THE CHANGE OF A LIFETIME: EMPLOYMENT
PATTERNS AMONG JAPAN’S MANAGERIAL ELITE 35 (1994). See also JOHANNES HIRSCHMEIER &
TSUNEHIKO YUI, THE DEVELOPMENT OF JAPANESE BUSINESS 1600–1973, at 82 (1975).
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investor groups or business promoters due to the underdevelopment of the
stock market. 134 Each business or investor group leader, called a “boss,”
nominally assumed a seat in the “board of directors” to act as a business
representative and maintain the balance of power. 135 As such, they were
“owner-controlled firms.” 136
These boss-directors, even if they owned and controlled the firm, were
busy with other companies and delegated management to administrative
staff. 137 They did not manage the corporate entity directly and were mainly
concerned with how secure their investments were. As a result, Japanese
scholars disagree on whether pre-war corporate governance can be likened
to the Anglo-Saxon model, since (1) boss-directors did not manage firms as
directors; and (2) investor groups eventually sold their shares and thus
helped to disperse ownership. 138 However, the boss-directors did not
effectively monitor management and the dispersal of ownership was very
brief. 139 By World War I, ownership and authority were again concentrated
in the hands of the few. 140 Thus, Japan’s pre-war corporate governance
structure did not reflect the U.S. model.
Another attribute of these companies was that their well-connected
owners cemented exceptional ties with the powers-that-be in the
government, which is comparable to today’s comfy government-business
liaison. 141 This explains how these businesses were able to thrive through
various wars, a totalitarian government in the 1930s, 142 foreign occupation,
and economic downturns.
A third attribute was that these trading houses and companies
considered their employees as family. Since they had to import technology
for armament production, they spent much time and resources training
employees. These skilled laborers were provided with housing, good
134. See generally Atsushi Tokuda, The Origin of the Corporation in Meiji Japan (U. London,
Working Paper No. DP21), http://www.cefims.ac.uk/documents/research-9.pdf.
135. Matao Miyamoto & Takeshi Abe, The Corporate Governance of Japanese Firms at the
Early Stages of Industrialization: Osaka Cotton Spinning and Nippon Life Assurance, in THE
DEVELOPMENT OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN JAPAN AND GREAT BRITAIN 10 (Robert
Fitzgerald & Etsuo Abe, eds., 2004).
136. Id. at 10–28. The more important joint stock companies during that era were the Osaka
Cotton Spinning Company (now Toyobo) founded in 1882, and Nippon Life Assurance
established in Osaka in 1889. See id.
137. Id. at 10, 20–21, 29.
138. Id. at 30.
139. JULIAN FRANKS, COLIN MAYER & HIDEAKI MIYAJIMA, EVOLUTION OF OWNERSHIP: THE
CURIOUS CASE OF JAPAN 8–9 (Preliminary First Draft, Mar. 25, 2007),
http://www.hbs.edu/units/bgie/pdf/miyajima.pdf.
140. See Zenichi Shishido, Reform in Japanese Corporate Law and Corporate Governance:
Current Changes in Historical Perspective, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 653, 657 (2001) [hereinafter
Shishido, Reform in Japanese Corporate Law].
141. Yoshiro Miwa & J. Mark Ramseyer, The Value of Prominent Directors: Lessons in
Corporate Governance from Transitional Japan, Nov. 1999, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
Delivery.cfm/991103100.pdf?abstractid=192388.
142. FRANKS, MAYER & MIYAJIMA, supra note 139, at 1.
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benefits and treated as familial members to encourage them to stay with the
company. This paternalistic pattern would continue for over a century. 143
During the 1920s and from 1935 to 1945, Japan’s expansionist
ambitions, coupled with its state interventionist approach, were in full
swing. 144 It again heavily supported and subsidized companies aiding the
war effort. These cartel-driven, tightly-held companies 145 were known as
zaibatsu, large family-controlled conglomerates with holding companies
that supplied government requirements and other products and services.
Due to their ties with politicians, zaibatsu umbrella companies cornered
government-business relations. By the mid-1930s, the banks became the
largest supplier of capital for zaibatsu companies. 146 The zaibatsu
emphasized growth through reinvestment of profits back into the company.
Equity shares were typically illiquid, as they were generally restricted to
zaibatsu family members. 147 The zaibatsu holding companies supervised
subsidiaries through budget control and managerial allocations, authorized
their financing, intervened in conflicts and disciplined them. 148 The pre-war
zaibatsu model was a form of “non-market-based governance.” 149 As a
result of the war efforts, the government concentrated planning and
administration of large companies to a central planning agency, which
ordered existing boards of directors to seek government approval before
implementing fundamental corporate changes or issuing debt or equity.150
For example, in 1939, boards were prohibited from declaring dividends and
reassigned this right to the central planning agency. 151
In 1943, Japan ushered in the Munitions Corporation Law, a law that
substantially altered corporate governance. 152 Corporate executives in

143. Kozo Yamamura, Entrepreneurship, Ownership, and Management in Japan, in THE
CAMBRIDGE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF EUROPE: THE INDUSTRIAL ECONOMIES: CAPITAL, LABOUR
AND ENTERPRISE, THE UNITED STATES, JAPAN AND RUSSIA 254–58 (Peter Mathias & M. M.
Postan, eds., 1983).
144. FRANKS, MAYER & MIYAJIMA, supra note 139, at 3, 15, 22.
145. Haruhito Takeda, Corporate Governance in the Inter-War Zaibatsu, in THE
DEVELOPMENT OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN JAPAN AND GREAT BRITAIN 59, 62–63 (Robert
Fitzgerald & Etsuo Abe, eds., 2004) (“The principle of ownership was based on investment
exclusivity, the limiting of investors to the same family, and the tendency to exclude potential
sources of capital from outside the family.”).
146. See generally HIDEMASA MORIKAWA, ZAIBATSU: THE RISE AND FALL OF FAMILY
ENTERPRISE GROUPS IN JAPAN (1992).
147. Id.
148. Takeda, supra note 145, at 68–71.
149. Id. at 71.
150. WALTER LAFEBER, THE CLASH: U.S.-JAPANESE RELATIONS THROUGHOUT HISTORY
162–63 (W.W. Norton & Co. 1998).
151. Shishido, Reform in Japanese Corporate Law, supra note 140, at 660.
152. The state could ratify company elections and also fire the president. On the other hand, the
company president could make decisions that were supposed to be made in a shareholders meeting
without the shareholders actually meeting. In short, the president assumed the power of the
shareholders. Tetsuji Okazaki, The Japanese Firm Under the Wartime Planned Economy, in THE
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Munitions Companies were no longer the agents of the shareholders, as was
stated in the Commercial Code. 153 They became responsible for attaining
manufacturing targets as dictated by the government or their industrial
groups. Instead of shareholder-elected directors, “selection of directors was
to be made independently of the shareholders; instead management
experience in the firm would be the chief criterion for appointment. Profits
were no longer to belong solely to the shareholders, but should be allocated
to workers, shareholders and directors.” 154 Nearing the end of the war,
about 700 firms were designated as Munitions Companies. 155 Each
company was assigned a bank by the Ministry of Finance that provided the
funds they needed to expand production (much like a Main Bank). 156 These
banks were required to provide the funds. They were also encouraged, but
not required, to monitor the affairs of the entity (similar to a Main Bank’s
“contingent monitoring”). 157
After Japan’s devastating defeat in 1945, it was occupied by the
Americans for seven years. “The final attacks on Japan . . . destroyed
production capacity, infrastructure and housing; disrupted supplies from
former trading partners in Asia . . . . Production collapsed, jobs and incomes
disappeared and hunger was rampant.” 158 Because the country fell apart,
people had to work cohesively. Desperate for food and jobs, they
steadfastly clung to each other. But the old bureaucrats who managed
Japan’s pre-war and wartime economy did not disappear; with a dearth of
individuals who could run the devastated country, they were tapped by the
Americans to fashion out policy reforms. 159 This promoted the continuity of
government patriarchy as a policy that emphasized state intervention when
necessary or desirable (later on manifesting itself in the deployment of
Ministry officials as board directors). 160 Many of the features of the
Japanese economy, such as bank-based financing, were also left in place.
But the American-led effort of “economic democratization” 161 broke up and
JAPANESE FIRM: THE SOURCES OF COMPETITIVE STRENGTH 372 (Masahiko Aoki & Ronald Dore,
eds., 1994).
153. Id. at 462.
154. See ALEXANDER, supra note 107, at 64.
155. YOSHIRO MIWA, STATE COMPETENCE AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN JAPAN 64 (2004).
156. Akira Hara, Wartime Controls, in ECONOMIC HISTORY OF JAPAN 1914-1955: A DUAL
STRUCTURE 276 (Takafusa Nakamura and Konosuke Odaka, eds., 2003).
157. Id.
158. ALEXANDER, supra note 107, at 7.
159. Indiana University Northwest, Japanese Economic Takeoff After 1945,
http://www.iun.edu/~hisdcl/h207_2002/jecontakeoff.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2009).
160. The underpinnings of post-war Japanese corporate governance—notably long-term
business relations, subsidies and protection for disadvantaged industries and groups, close
government-business connections, and political protection for favored clients—clearly all were the
result of corporate developments from the 1870s to the 1940s when Japan was defeated in the
Second World War. See John K.M. Ohnesorge, States, Industrial Policies & Antidumping
Enforcement in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, 3 BUFF. J. INT’L L. 289, 320–23 (1996–97).
161. See ALEXANDER, supra note 107, at 81.
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dismantled the concentrated ownership structure of major zaibatsu holding
companies such as Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, Yasuda and Fuji through
the Anti-Monopoly Law of 1947. 162
The American occupation regime clearly had a reformist approach as to
where Japanese corporate law should go. Because the legal division of the
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) in Tokyo was
dominated by lawyers, judges and scholars with training from the
University of Illinois and Chicago-based experience (headed by Lester
Salwin and Irving Eisenstein), SCAP rewrote the Japanese Commercial
Code with an obvious inclination towards Illinois corporate law. 163 It
specifically emphasized shareholder rights as opposed to the Germaninspired 1899 Japanese Commercial Code or Law No. 48, which German
scholar and professor Hermann Roesler helped draft. The Illinois lawleaning 164 draft revision immediately drew antagonistic reactions from the
Japanese as they have long viewed active shareholders as troublemakers. 165
When the Japanese Diet passed the final draft in May 1950 (1950
Commercial Code), shareholders rights were heightened, 166 an evolved
board of directors was formally established, 167 the concept of director
accountability was introduced, and the power of the statutory auditor was
reduced. 168 The final draft was a mix of Illinois law, old German concepts

162. Gregory K. Bader, Note, The Keiretsu Distribution System of Japan: Its Steadfast
Existence Despite Heightened Foreign and Domestic Pressure for Dissolution, 27 CORNELL INT’L
L.J. 365, 368–69 (1994).
163. Mark D. West, The Puzzling Divergence of Corporate Law: Evidence and Explanations
from Japan and the United States, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 527, 539–43 (2001) [hereinafter West, The
Puzzling Divergence of Corporate Law].
164. The interesting question is why the Americans who were in charge of reconstructing
Japan’s corporate law and governance chose Illinois law instead of the more developed Delaware
corporate law. Understandably, since they were Chicago practitioners who studied at the
University of Illinois, they would choose their own. However, it went beyond that. There appears
to be some apprehension and mistrust towards Delaware law and jurisprudence on their part. See
Katharina Pistor et al., The Evolution of Corporate Law: A Cross-Country Comparison, 23 U. PA.
J. INT’L ECON. L. 791, 852–53 (2002) (“American advisors chose the Illinois model because it
offered ‘better’ shareholder protection. They viewed the developments in Delaware with suspicion
and supported a stronger hand of the legislature in lawmaking . . . . The more pragmatic evolution
of corporate law in Delaware, where practitioners rather than law professors had the decisive
influence on the laws’ contents, took a different, and ultimately more successful, path.”).
165. ALEXANDER, supra note 107, at 98. See also Thomas L. Blakemore & Makoto Yazawa,
Japanese Commercial Code Revisions Concerning Corporations, 2 AM. J. COMP. L. 12, 20
(1953).
166. The 1950 revision gave the shareholders a voice, regulated potential conflicts of interest,
and required periodic disclosure of financial data. See West, The Puzzling Divergence of
Corporate Law, supra note 163, at 545.
167. Directors shall be appointed at the general meeting of shareholders. SHŌNŌ, art. 254, para
1. Boards shall be composed of a minimum of three members (SHŌNŌ, art. 255), whose terms
shall not be more than two years. SHŌNŌ, art. 256, para 1.
168. See West, The Puzzling Divergence of Corporate Law, supra note 163, at 545.

346

BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.

[Vol. 3

and Japanese norms; it was generally unpopular. 169 The Americans also
permitted unionization, 170 which further entrenched workers and made them
immovable. Threatened, too, with the specter of frivolous shareholder
lawsuits, the Japanese pressured the Americans to make it more expensive
for lawsuits to be filed. The required bond was subsequently so
expensive, 171 that it chilled shareholder litigation until its revision in 1993,
when the filing fee was reset to a mere 8,200 yen (about $82.33). 172
It was a different story when the Americans left in 1952. By then, the
former zaibatsu companies had merely recombined into looser federations
(keiretsu), where bank financing, mutual assistance, government
connections and patriarchy played key roles, thus mirroring the dynamics of
their zaibatsu predecessors. 173 The zaibatsu conglomerates resurrected
themselves through the keiretsu companies’ web-like cross-shareholding
pattern, minus the dominant families’ ownership monopoly. 174 Admittedly,
however, the de-concentration and anti-trust activities of the Americans
weakened the business concentration fabric. 175 The holding company
structure of the zaibatsu companies and the investments of the privileged
zaibatsu families were successfully discontinued. 176
When the Americans left and the Japanese bureaucrats were placed in
charge of implementing the 1950 Commercial Code, they interpreted and
administered it their way. As a result, there was a large gap between the
black-letter provisions of the 1950 Commercial Code and actual practice.
Since there was general opposition towards the American-made, Illinois
law-leaning corporate governance structure, there was an informal protest
against the 1950 Commercial Code. 177 Instead of boards monitoring the
169. See Blakemore & Yazawa, supra note 165, at 12 (The “product is far from pleasing, and in
practice it has produced confusion . . . [causing] bewilderment to Japanese legal scholars.”).
170. Japanese unions emphasized job security and the Seniority-Wage System.
171. Before 1993, plaintiffs had to pay a filing fee on a sliding scale, the basis of which was the
amount of damages sought. Thus, a $10 million claim in a derivative suit would have required a
filing fee of about $25,000, which plaintiffs would forfeit if they lost. See Curtis J. Milhaupt,
Nonprofit Organizations as Investor Protection: Economic Theory, and Evidence from East Asia,
29 YALE J. INT’L L. 169, 188 (2004).
172. See West, Why Shareholders Sue, supra note 33, at 353.
173. Kenichi Osugi, What is Converging? Rules on Hostile Takeovers in Japan and the
Convergence Debate, 9 ASIAN-PACIFIC L. & POL’Y J. 143, 150 (2007) (“In Japan, however,
zaibatsu (vertically formed corporate groups) were dismantled by General Headquarters as a key
occupation policy after World War II. Instead, large companies in Japan developed a horizontal
ownership structure or interlocking share holding schemes. Until recently, this horizontal scheme,
coupled with a social norm that favored long-term relationships, effectively prevented hostile
takeovers of listed companies.”).
174. Masahiro Shimotani, Recent Changes in Inter-Firm Relations in Japan: the Six Large
Corporate Complexes, in THE DEVELOPMENT OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN JAPAN AND
GREAT BRITAIN 196 (Robert Fitzgerald & Etsuo Abe, eds., 2004).
175. EIJI TAKEMAE ET AL., ALLIED OCCUPATION OF JAPAN 336–37 (2003).
176. See ALEXANDER, supra note 107, at 96.
177. Shishido, Reform in Japanese Corporate Law, supra note 140, at 664–65. See also West,
The Puzzling Divergence of Corporate Law, supra note 163, at 569.
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company officers and charting strategic directions, directors nominally
performed such functions. They made the directorship the highest position a
loyal employee could ever aspire to and filled the board with as many
members as possible. 178 Since the board was now composed of senior
managers, it did not normally sanction its members. The Japanese erased
the board’s monitoring function not by amending the law but by indirectly
circumventing it. They subtly turned the U.S. creation into a Japanese one.
IV. A MONITORING OR MANAGING BOARD?
According to Martin Lipton and Jay Lorsch, the ideal U.S. board should
be a monitoring board with three important committees composed solely of
independent directors. 179 The board’s role is to select, evaluate and reward
CEOs. 180 It must also ensure that corporate officers comply with federal and
state laws. 181 In addition, it should approve corporate strategy, assess this
strategy, and undergo CEO and board performance evaluation. 182 Moreover,
Eugene Fama and Michael Jensen illustrate that the monitoring function is
embedded in the separation of ownership and control, and in which the
residual risk bearers are separate from the ones who are going to make
corporate policies. 183
The post-war Japanese board model is a managing board, which is
drastically different from the framework described by Lipton and Lorsch
(1992), Fama and Jensen (1983), or Berle and Means (1932). Most of the
directors are managing directors (jugyoin kenmu torishimariyaku or
directors functioning as employees of the company). There is virtually no
distinction between execution and supervision. Decision-making and
monitoring functions congruently overlap. 184 This board can even be
described as an operations board. Directors, once elected, are independently
responsible to shareholders for managing the company. Thus, once the
board makes certain managerial decisions, the director responsible or
assigned by the board must see to it that it is carried out. 185 The board, as a
body, must then oversee the assigned or appointed director. This is possible
because the inside directors are promoted from within the corporate
178. See West, The Puzzling Divergence of Corporate Law, supra note 163, at 559.
179. See generally Martin Lipton & Jay W. Lorsch, A Modest Proposal For Improved

Corporate Governance, 48 BUS. LAW. 59 (1992).
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. See generally Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and
Control, 26 J. L. & ECON. 301 (1983).
184. As an example, see the complicity of the managing-director of the New York Daiwa Bank
during the 1999 scandal where a Daiwa bond trader successfully hid $1.1 billion in losses for
eleven years through illegal trading. See generally Tsuyoshi Yamada, The Daiwa Bank Case
(1999), 15 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 193 (2002).
185. See Yasui, supra note 47, at 124.
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structure—middle management employees who see directorship as the
pinnacle of their lifetime company service. In most cases, these inside
directors continue to be employees of the corporation and receive both
employee salary and director pay.
Beyond these employees who become directors while retaining their
worker status, the Main Bank, as the owner of huge numbers of shares,
sends executives to occupy directorship positions. 186 Other stakeholders,
particularly customers and business partners who also own significant
holdings, are likewise represented in the board. These “shareholders [who]
are usually affiliated companies in the same corporate group . . . or
important business counterparts of the company . . . sometimes send their
personnel to the board as directors or statutory auditors, which proves a
means to control management directly.” 187 Instead of a separation between
ownership and control, there is a marriage between the residual owners and
the corporate controllers. They own it, they control it.
There are certain advantages for the Japanese board model. It gives
sufficient incentives for employees to be loyal to the company, since the
possibility of becoming a director is not far-fetched. As board members
actively manage employees, they know the company well and can chart
strategic growth and optimal use of its resources. Japanese managers may
complain that the U.S. board model is full of independent directors who are
elected to promote shareholders’ interests and increase share value, the
consequence of which is that these outsiders may not know much about
running the company. 188 The ranks-to-director approach also leads to
stability and harmony with the organization.
But there are inherent flaws in the managing board model. First, it tends
to entrench the company president and other officers. Many board insiders
are still company employees and therefore subservient to the president.
They will not be able to monitor his activities well enough, and even if they
do find something amiss, they will neither have the courage nor temerity to
question it. This echoes the point of UCLA Professor Bainbridge when he
found that U.S. directors tended not only to be friends or colleagues of the
CEO, but also people beholden to him. 189 The CEO’s accountability is even
more dramatic in Japan where the director position is subordinate to the
president. Second, as there is seniority within the employees’ ranks, there is
186. Paul Sheard, Banks, Blockholders and Corporate Governance: The Role of External
Appointees to the Board, in JAPANESE FIRMS, FINANCE AND MARKETS 181 (1996).
187. Yasui, supra note 47, at 130.
188. See Yoshiro Miwa, Corporate Social Responsibility: Dangerous and Harmful, Though
Maybe Not Irrelevant, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1227, 1234 (1999) [hereinafter Miwa, Corporate
Social Responsbility].
189. See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why a Board? Group Decisionmaking in Corporate
Governance, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2002). See also Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent
Directors in the United States, 1950-2000: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59
STAN. L. REV. 1465 (2007).
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a similar seniority and rigid hierarchy within the directorship level.
Younger employee-directors are inclined to view older employee-directors
as their progenitors/senior officers and will bestow more reverence than
monitoring. Concomitantly, the board is divided between senior members
and junior directors, with the latter providing most of the employee
functions as instructed by the board. 190
Third, the company president is predisposed—as a result of the large
board membership, which can be anywhere between 20 to 40 directors
during any given year 191—to form a smaller, elitist committee of directors
composed of himself and senior members of the board (jomu-kai). 192 The
segregation between senior and junior board members, plus the
establishment of a smaller senior executive committee, destroys any notion
that the board is performing monitoring functions or acts in a collegial
manner. Lastly, the management decisions by this elite committee are
mechanically rubber-stamped by the bigger, all-inclusive board of directors
since the younger directors essentially have no voice.
In post-war corporate Japan, if the word “monitoring” is mentioned, it
is not associated with the board of directors. It is more related to the selfinterested role of the Main Bank, which is to monitor the business and
affairs of the company, if not periodically at least. This monitoring role of
the Main Bank is not shared by other stakeholders, who are simply freeriders. 193
V. MANAGED FOR WHOM?
In post-war corporate Japan, corporations are primarily managed for the
stakeholders. This includes employees, banks, suppliers, customers,
business partners, the community and, in some respect, shareholders. 194
This stakeholder-oriented model 195 is quite different from the shareholder

190. See, e.g., Takashi Araki, A Comparative Analysis: Corporate Governance and Labor and
Employment Relations in Japan, 22 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 67, 76 (2000) [hereinafter Araki, A
Comparative Analysis].
191. See Nottage, supra note 11, at 269.
192. Sanford M. Jacoby, Convergence by Design: The Case of CalPERS in Japan, 55 AM. J.
COMP. L. 239, 283 (2007). See also Dore, supra note 89, at 164.
193. See Yasui, supra note 47, at 133.
194. Nottage, supra note 11, at 262–93.
195. This may mirror Lynn Stout’s theory of a Mediating Board. Professor Stout believes that
boards should mediate with asset-specific groups as it is the directors’ duty to protect these other
groups or stakeholders. Maximizing the value of corporate law requires maximizing all of the
investments of all the stakeholders in a company. “[M]any directors do view themselves as
mediators trying to balance shareholders’ interests against those of creditors, employees and the
like. . . . [T]he mediating model does not confine the directors’ role only to limiting how much
wealth the firms’ executives extract from the firm. Directors also limit how much wealth is
distributed to the firm’s shareholders, creditors, and even to the local community. . . . Directors
are also fiduciaries of the firm itself, an entity that can be understood as a nexus of firm-specific
commitments made by investors, managers, and other corporate constituencies.” Lynn A. Stout,
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primacy model advocated in the United States. Some have described the
Japanese type as an “employee-centered stakeholder model” and an
“employee-sovereign firm”, but as Takashi Araki said in defending his
home country’s system, “Japanese law resembles more the Anglo-Saxon
shareholder-value model than the stakeholder model.” 196 However, he
himself admits that there is a divergence between black-letter law and
practice in that “law and reality often diverge. There has been a consensus
among Japanese corporate law professors that, irrespective of the principles
and theories stated in the corporate laws, in practice, larger companies are
administered by the prioritization of the interests of employees.” 197 Araki
avers that it is actually a “practice-dependent stakeholder model,” with
practice meaning the culture of managing directors, lifetime employees,
focus on employee welfare, balancing of other stakeholders’ interests, and
cross-shareholders’ interests. 198 In reality, beyond the statutory text, the role
of management is not necessarily to increase the value of the shares and
satisfy the passive shareholders. Rather, its critical task is to always balance
corporate obligations with the interests of employees, suppliers, partners,
customers and other stakeholders by allocating specific pieces of the
corporate pie.
This model is essentially related to the Japanese “Company
Community” model, which consists of “management, board members and
core employees who share an identity as ‘company men’ . . . ‘company’
refers to the collective Company Community . . . [whose] members . . . owe
their loyalty to both the Community itself and their fellow members” with
“employees as the quasi-residual claimants.” 199 But this Company
The Shareholder As Ulysses: Some Empirical Evidence on Why Investors in Public Corporations
Tolerate Board Governance, 152 U. PA L. REV. 667, 686–88 (2003).
196. Takashi Araki, Changing Employment Practices, Corporate Governance, and the Role of
Labor Law in Japan, 28 COMP. LABOR LAW & POL’Y J. 251, 263 (2007) [hereinafter Araki,
Changing Employment Practices]. See also Araki, A Comparative Analysis, supra note 190, at 87.
See also Gilson & Milhaupt, supra note 38, at 348 (stating that board members are typically
representative of, and are, current employees).
197. Araki, Changing Employment Practices, supra note 196, at 263–64.
198. Id. at 265. This is in conjunction with what Gilson and Milhaupt call “stakeholder
tunneling,” a type of diversion of resources away from shareholders and representative of the
Japanese commitment of maximization of employee interests instead of shareholder value (for
example, maintaining employees even in the face of serious financial difficulties or pursuit of
expansion without careful review of profitability). See Gilson & Milhaupt, supra note 38, at 361.
199. See Shishido, Japanese Corporate Governance, supra note 9, at 189, 202. Shishido further
advocates that, despite certain differences, the U.S. and Japan “still maintain the same basic
structure” and “nearly identical corporate legal systems,” that “Japanese corporate law is more
loyal to shareholder ownership than American corporate law,” and that there exists “a mechanism
to relieve oppressed minorities.” Id. at 194, 195, 197, 201. These are not entirely accurate. It is
true that Japan’s corporate law has been influenced tremendously by the U.S. since the latter
revised its Commercial Code during the Occupation years. However, to say that both countries
maintain the same basic structures is to stretch matters rather awkwardly. Japan has its own way
of doing things which may stray from the bare recitals of black letter law. The board is dominated
by the company president, is composed primarily of insiders, and sprinkled with grey directors.
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Community, together with lifetime employment, has been declining in
recent years as companies hire new staff on a short-term basis or as parttime contractors instead of treating them as part of the corporate family. Not
only due to global competition and the storm of M&A activities, younger
Japanese white-collar workers have also refused to make the company the
center of their lives and have subtly discarded corporate paternalism by
shifting jobs 200 or professions. 201
Under the stakeholder-oriented model, the company has no choice but
to see to it that the stakeholders are satisfied and happy with corporate
performance. Specifically, stakeholders include: (a) employees and their
lifetime employment guarantee system; (b) the Main Bank; (c) customers,
other banks and business partners; and (d) the state’s strategically-placed
retired or soon-to-retire ministry officials. 202 It is therefore not managed for
shareholders other than the Main Bank and companies under the same
keiretsu. In a way, because of the unique system in Japan, the corporation is
managed for only those shareholders who have representatives sitting on
the board. Individual shareholders and institutional investors are largely
ignored. There are no mechanisms in place to communicate with
unaffiliated shareholders, no shareholder dialogues or resolutions, and
derivative suits are uncommon and deliberately expensive. 203 Therefore, it
is essential for a shareholder to gain a voice on the board to defend its
interests.
VI. CRITERIA FOR BECOMING A JAPANESE DIRECTOR
Japanese directors are elected by the shareholders at a general
shareholder meeting. 204 However, the company president has a lot of
influence over who will be selected to serve as directors. The president
This is a far cry from the U.S. model. Japan’s loyalty to shareholder ownership is also no greater
than the U.S. Japanese corporations’ loyalty to the insider shareholders (e.g. Main Bank, creditors,
business partners, consumers) and such insiders’ positions. Moreover, companies did not care at
all, until very recently, with domestic/unaffiliated shareholders and institutional shareholders.
Even if there was a written way to assuage oppressed minorities, these non-insider shareholders
have suffered inattention and disregard for decades. Shareholder proposals were relatively
unknown to Japan for a very long time. Many companies orchestrated and scripted their annual
shareholder meetings to stifle dissent and suppress opinion by instructing their employees to clap
continuously when a shareholder raises a point, or hired and paid off the Sokaiya or corporate
gangsters to intimidate courageous shareholders. See id.
200. Workers are shifting jobs even though leaving the company is considered a form of
betrayal by older generations.
201. THE ECONOMIST, Sayonary, Salaryman, Jan. 5, 2008. Younger generations of Japanese
workers are seeking “work-life balance.” Id.
202. Peter Lawley, Panacea or Placebo? An Empirical Analysis of the Effect of the Japanese
Committee System Corporate Governance Law Reform, 9 ASIAN PACIFIC L. & POL’Y J. 105, 121
(2007) (It “reflects the status quo of the corporate structure in Japan whereby the directors of a
company represent various divisions of the company.”).
203. See generally West, Why Shareholders Sue, supra note 33.
204. Miwa, Corporate Social Responsibility, supra note 188, at 1231.
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chooses the nominees, who are confirmed by the shareholders during the
annual meeting. 205 Directors are mostly representative directors 206 who act
for their respective stakeholder groups.
Before the bubble burst 207 and almost ten years thereafter, it was not
particularly difficult to become a director in a Japanese entity, markedly
because of the large size of the board and the fact that most board members
were insiders. 208 Inside directors were essentially middle-level employees
who rose up the ranks and were awarded the distinction of serving the board
of directors because of the strength of their loyalty and commitment to the
company. 209 The directorship was dangled as the “ultimate prize of the
permanent employment system.” 210 These directors were regarded as the
ultimate leaders of all of the employees, particularly since they still retained
their managerial and operational responsibilities. 211 These employeeinsiders were handpicked by management and confirmed during the
shareholders meeting.
Outside directors may either be grey directors or independent ones.
Independent outside directors (dokuritsu shagai torishimariyaku) are those
who have absolutely no ties with management, have never been employees,
suppliers, or creditors of the company, and are truly independent in
perspective. The Japanese Commercial Code does not require the presence
of independent directors. 212 Grey outside directors, on the other hand, are
never truly independent and hardly possess an outsider’s point of view.
Many are current government officials from ministries or agencies that have
strong links with the company such as the Ministry of Finance. They are
deployed to the board of directors in their twilight years 213 not just to serve
as conduit officers, but similarly to reward them for their good government
service. These directors are known as amakudari, literally meaning “sent
205. MAKOTO OHTSU & TOMIO IMANARI, INSIDE JAPANESE BUSINESS: A NARRATIVE
HISTORY, 1960-2000, at 359 (2002). See also Senechal, supra note 32, at 541–42 (One problem in
corporate Japan is that there are “too-powerful chief executives . . . [and] a corporate governance
system that provides few controls on executive action and little emphasis on shareholders.”).
206. Senechal, supra note 32, at 542–43.
207. See ALEXANDER, supra note 107, at 191 (“Businesses indulged in over-investment, hired
too many employees and borrowed too heavily. Banks lent too freely to over-leveraged customers
and acquired large amounts of loans that could not be repaid, especially after the collapse of a land
and shares asset price bubble in the early 1990s. The financial authorities were complicit in
allowing banks to cover up their non-performing loans, which were eroding bank capital.”).
208. Senechal, supra note 32, at 536.
209. Miwa, Corporate Social Responsibility, supra note 188, at 1234.
210. See Ahmadjian & Okumura, supra note 16, at 132.
211. See Yasui, supra note 47, at 123.
212. In 2005, a complete revision of Japanese Commercial Code took place and the Diet
ushered in the new Company Act that went into effect on May 1, 2006. This new law requires the
presence of independent directors only if the company chooses the Committee System over the
Statutory Auditor system. Companies Act, Act No. 86 of 2005, art. 47, translated in CABINET
SECRETARIAT, available at http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/hourei/data/CA1_4_2.pdf.
213. See ALEXANDER, supra note 107, at 99–100.
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down from heaven,” and strengthen government-business relations. They
are also sent to supplement their meager government income with the
higher salaries provided by the private sector. 214 Grey outside directors are
also comprised of retired government ministry officials, likewise part of the
amakudari, who are deployed to guarantee the good performance of the
company—a way for the government to look out for the interests of the
private sector. 215 Grey outside directors may likewise be bank executives,
or the officers of customers or parent companies. Their primary role is to
make sure that the good, harmonious relationship between the company and
their original employers is maintained; or if they are from the Main Bank,
to act as overseers during any corporate reorganization.
Despite impressions to the contrary, Main Bank board directors are
generally found to be inordinately successful in their monitoring functions
(or at least they were before the bubble burst), as they capably oversee the
activities and decisions of the board and its corporate officers. 216 They are
able to intervene when necessary, remove underperforming CEOs, 217 and
provide much needed liquidity to the company. 218
VII. BOARD REFORMS, JAPANESE-STYLE
Japan reacted swiftly and drastically to the market conditions resulting
from the bubble burst and the economic stagnation of the 1990s. In
response to the introduction of legislative reform, the boards of directors,
once described as merely ceremonial and comprised of the elders of the
corporate community, 219 responded affirmatively. Many companies
downsized their board of directors for efficiency and some included
independent outside directors for objectivity. 220 More importantly, by the
end of the 1990s, the Japanese business monoliths were reduced to a game
of survival of the fittest. Because the Main Banks were no longer
214. See Ahmadjian & Okumura, supra note 16, at 132.
215. Kenji Suzuki, The Changing Pattern of Amakudari Appointments – The Case of Regional

Banks 1991-2000 8 (Working Paper No. 187, Jan. 2004), available at
http://swopec.hhs.se/eijswp/papers/eijswp0187.pdf.
216. YUWA WEI, COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 151–152 (2003).
217. See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor as
Corporate Monitor, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1277, 1300 (1991).
218. See generally Yoshiro Miwa & J. Mark Ramseyer, The Myth of the Main Bank: Japan and
Comparative Corporate Governance, 27 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 401 (2002).
219. SIMON LEARMOUNT, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: WHAT CAN BE LEARNED FROM JAPAN?
125–143 (2002). Many directors view board meetings as simply ceremonial since decisions are
really made by the senior executive committee or jomu-kai of the board, while the plenary board
just rubber-stamps and ratifies them.
220. However, some Japanese companies resorted to merely renaming their structures without a
substantial change in functions, attitude and outlook. Since their boards were composed of the
elitist senior management committee (with the company president) and a larger plenary group
inclusive of junior board members who were concurrent executive officers, they simply renamed
the former as the “board” (hence making it a 10-man member) while denominating the junior
members as “executive officers.” See Araki, A Comparative Analysis, supra note 190, at 74–78.

354

BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.

[Vol. 3

functioning at their previous levels, companies were continuously looking
for external financing via the capital markets. 221 Consequently, the
economic pendulum swung from crisis to promise of recovery to crisis once
again. There was also a clear corporate governance vacuum as the
government did not know how to respond to the burgeoning equity
dominance of U.S and U.K. shareholders. 222 The Japanese government
knew that reform was necessary despite howling protests and resistance
from hardliners in the corporate boardrooms.
The series of reforms undertaken by the Japanese government in the
1990s, known as the “financial Big Bang,” 223 stressed deregulation. 224 It
included limiting the board presence of retired government officials
“descen[d] from heaven” or amakudari by withholding National Personnel
Authority waivers. 225 The amakudari were viewed as inefficient by foreign
shareholders, and in 2007, a law was passed aimed specifically at reducing
the amakudari problem. 226 In 1997, stock options were allowed, and in
December 2001, directors’ personal liability was limited. 227 In 2002, the
government introduced the alien concept of independent directors when it
amended the Commercial Code. 228 The definition, however, of independent
outside directors was so weak 229 that it permitted the appointment of
221. Trends in Japan, Banging on Japan’s Door: Big Bang Reforms Attract Overseas Banks,
Sep. 9, 1997, http://web-japan.org/trends98/honbun/ntj970909.html.
222. See Nottage, supra note 11, at 269.
223. Shinji Fukukawa, Development of the Japanese Big Bang and its Impact, Nov. 11, 1997,
http://brie.berkeley.edu/research/forum/fukukawa.html.
224. Edward J. Lincoln & Robert E. Litan, The “Big Bang”? An Ambivalent Japan Deregulates
Its
Financial
Markets,
BROOKINGS
(1998),
available
at
http://www.brookings.edu/articles/1998/winter_globaleconomics _lincoln.aspx?rssid=japan.
225. RICHARD A. COLIGNON & CHIKAKO USUI, AMAKUDARI: THE HIDDEN FABRIC OF JAPAN’S
ECONOMY 23 (2003).
226. The Diet approved on June 30, 2007 a bill revising the National Public Service Law
specifically on the regulation of future employment of retiring national public servants called
“Amakudari.” See Hiroko Nakata, Cabinet OKs ‘Amakudari’ Bill, Bureaucrat Reform, Apr. 25,
2007, THE JAPAN TIMES ONLINE, available at http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgibin/nn20070425f2.html. See also Hiroko Nakata, ‘Amakudari’ Too Entrenched to Curb?, May 29,
2007, THE JAPAN TIMES ONLINE, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/mail/nn20070529i1.html.
227. Bernard S. Black, Brian R. Cheffins & Michael Klausner, Shareholder Suits and Outside
Director Liability: The Case of Korea 17–18 (European Corporate Governance Institute Law
Working Paper N 47/2005; University of Texas Law School Law and Economics Research Paper
No. 35; and Stanford Law School John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics Working Paper
No. 298; 2005), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=628223. See also Australian
Institute of Company Directors, Risky Business Directors and Lawsuits, Feb. 2005,
http://www.companydirectors.com.au/Media/Company+Director/2005/February/Risky+business+
directors+and+lawsuits+Cover+Story.htm (citing and analyzing the above article written by
Bernard S. Black, Brian R. Cheffins, & Michael Klausner); Barry Metzger, Kym Bavcevich &
Shintaro Kuroda, Japan: Overview of Recent Corporate Governance Reforms,
http://www.globalcorporategovernance.com/n_ap/283_291.htm (last visited Mar. 14, 2009).
228. Shoho to no ichibu wo kaisei suru horitsu [Act Partially Amending the Commercial Code],
(Law No. 44, 2002).
229. Individuals who have never previously been an executive director, are not currently
employed by the company, and have never been employed by the company or any of its
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“family members, golf buddies, or old dormitory roommates as outside
directors to ensure entrenchment of the incumbent management.” 230 Even
the amakudari could be legally appointed. In particular, the 2002 law
allowed the companies to choose between: (1) the U.S.-style board which
has three committees, nominating, audit and remuneration, that are to be
composed primarily by independent directors (the Company with
Committees system (iinkai setchi gaisha)); or the (2) traditional statutory
auditor system (kensayaku) by which no independent directors were
required to be appointed. 231
Before the onslaught of U.S.-style reforms such as the Company with
Committees system, the Japanese Commercial Code required firms to have
statutory auditors 232 (theoretically elected directly by shareholders) whose
function was to audit the board and to ensure accuracy of financial
reports. 233 The auditors would sometimes sit in board meetings as nonvoting members. These statutory auditors, though mandated by law to be
chosen by the shareholders and nominally empowered with vast oversight
authority, 234 served in fact at the pleasure of the company president. They
were typically not independent 235 since the post could be occupied by
former employees who had not worked for the firm in the last five years. 236
There were no special qualifications to become a statutory auditor. Due to
their weak and often conflicted status, 237 statutory auditors did not play the
role of independent directors 238 as would be expected of members of an

subsidiaries Kaisha Ho [Company Law], (Law No. 86, Art. 2, Par. 15, 2005). The same broad,
weak definition of outside directors was found in Article 188 of the Commercial Code. See Shōhō
[COMMERCIAL CODE], Art. 188(2)(7.2) (2002) (Japan).
230. See Tomotaka Fujita, Modernising Japanese Corporate Law: Ongoing Corporate Law
Reform in Japan, 16 SING. ACAD. L.J. 321, 340 (2004).
231. See generally Toda & McCarty, supra note 22.
232. Statutory Auditors have been in existence since the Commercial Code’s enactment in
1899. However, the position is essentially functionally weaker if compared to the supervisory
board of German corporate governance. In 1993, as part of the reforms as a result of the bubble
burst, the government introduced the board of statutory auditors (for companies with paid-up
capital exceeding 500 million yen or with total liabilities in excess of 20 billion yen) composed of
at least 3 auditors, with one full time and one “independent.” See LAWS & REGULATIONS ON
SETTING UP BUSINESS IN JAPAN, JAPAN EXTERNAL TRADE ORG. 6 (Nov. 2008),
http://www.jetro.go.jp/en/invest/setting_up/pdf/2008setting_e.pdf
233. Lawley, supra note 202, at 109.
234. Statutory auditors can demand reports from employees and the board of directors, attend
but not vote in board meetings, seek the re-study or suspension of a director’s actions or program
if deemed not in the best interest of the company, and examine the financial condition of the firm.
They cannot appoint or seek the removal of directors, and do not necessarily represent shareholder
or employee interests. See generally LAWS & REGULATIONS ON SETTING UP BUSINESS IN JAPAN,
supra note 232.
235. See LEARMOUNT, supra note 219, at 131–33.
236. See Toda & McCarty, supra note 22, at 204.
237. Other than being former employees, statutory auditors may also be employees of business
partners, group companies, the Main Bank or other large shareholders.
238. Senechal, supra note 32, at 543–44.
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audit committee in a U.S. corporate board setting. Below is a flowchart of
the traditional statutory auditor system:
Source: Mitsuru Tanaka (Jones Day
Showa/Tokyo), Japanese Corporate
Governance, International Financial
Law Review Corporate Governance
2003 Supplement, http://www.iflr.com/
Article/2026792/Japan.html (last visited
on Apr. 14, 2009).
The representative directors do not comprise a separate body despite being in a
separate box. They form a big part of the
board and have executive powers in the
company. They represent the various
stakeholders, especially the employees.
Key features: Statutory auditors are (a)
usually dominated and beholden to the
company president; (b) appointed by the
president; (c) not independent generally;
(d) may be conflicted; and (e) have vast
powers theoretically.

As a result of the 2002 amendment, companies such as AEON, a
leading supermarket chain that boasts of large retail areas in major cities,
can choose to institute the U.S.-inspired committee system. 239 Once a
company opts for the committee system by amending the certificate of
incorporation, it is required to appoint three members for each of the
committees, a majority of whom should be independent outside directors.240
The same independent outside director may sit in all three committees. 241
This means that the minimum requirement for a committee system
corporation is two independent directors who can concurrently sit in all
three committees. If the company wishes to remain steadfastly traditional,
239. See generally id.
240. The 2002 amendment to the Commercial Code paved the way for a choice between the

statutory auditor model and the U.S.-style committee system. This was reinforced in 2005 with the
passage of Kaisha Ho [Company Law], Law No. 86, Article 400, in 2005. Gilson and Mihaupt
described this choice as regulatory reform, made in an unusual fashion, and was an enabling
strategy of reform. It allowed companies to choose what they felt was best for them. This enabling
system mirrors the U.S. corporate governance model where traditionally everything is available
and nothing is required. This has been changing, however, with strict NYSE and SEC
requirements. See Gilson & Milhaupt, supra note 38, at 344. With the 2002 reform, the Company
with Committee system (Company with Three Committee System or iinkai setchi gaisha) is
available only for large companies, specifically those with capitalization was more than 500
million yen or whose total debt on a balance sheet was more than 20 billion yen. With the 2005
overhaul (the new Company Act), however, the committee system has been opened to all
companies, regardless of capital or debt. If companies chose the Company with Committee
structure, they will have to amend their articles of incorporation or memorandum of association.
241. See Senechal, supra note 32, at 551–53.
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as most have, it can opt for the statutory auditor system and still not be
required to appoint independent directors. 242 This was further clarified in
the 2005 Company Act, 243 the law that completely overhauled the
Commercial Code. Below is a flowchart of the Company with Committees
model:

Source: Mitsuru Tanaka (Jones Day Showa/Tokyo), Japanese Corporate Governance, International Financial Law Review Corporate Governance 2003 Supplement,
http://www.iflr.com/Article/2026792/Japan.html (last visited on Apr. 14, 2009).
According to Tanaka, the "Shikko-yaku" (corporate executive officer) is “entitled to make decisions
regarding business operations (as) entrusted by the board of directors and operate the business of
the company . . . although the board of directors retains the authority to determine the business
operations of the company, most of its decision-making function can be transferred to the Shikkoyaku except for certain specified items.”
The Shikko-yaku is like the U.S. CEO, except that his powers and authority are wholly dependent
on the board. Since 2003, Sony has adopted the Company with Committees model together with
the Shikko-yaku system, thus separating the functions of monitoring and management.
Key features: (a) incorporates a U.S.-style committee system; (b) the majority of committee members must be “independent”; (c) a diluted definition of “independent” outside directors; and (d) is
not preferred by most Japanese corporations.

242. See id. at 536.
243. Kaisha Ho [Company Law], Law No. 86 (2005).
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Whether a firm chooses the Company with Committees system or the
statutory auditor model, the following diagram illustrates the general
composition of the board of directors:

Senior Executive Committee
or Jomu-kai composed of the
president and senior board
members

Junior Board Members
(representing departments)

Japanese Board of Directors

Elite senior group comprising about 910 persons who make the real decisions
(an informal management committee
according to Gilson & Milhaupt). See
Gilson & Milhaupt, supra note 38, at
343, 349.

Beholden junior directors who await
Jomu-kai instructions (around 20–30
people).
Largely ceremonial, rubber-stamping
body which may have the 3 U.S.-style
committees with at least 2 “outside”
directors each.

The choice to have either the committee system or the statutory auditor
system was a compromise between the Ministry of Justice and the business
sector; with the business oligarchs not wanting to be compelled to appoint
independent directors. 244 The 2002 reform and 2005 overhaul were intended
to increase the oversight function of the board and to further segregate
decision-making from supervisory functions within a company. 245 But since
the 2005 Company Act also provided for directors simultaneously serving
as executive officers or employees of the corporation, 246 an idiosyncratic
feature of Japanese corporate culture, the attainment of these goals was
limited.
As expected, the old oligarchs at the helm of the great Japanese
companies prevailed not only in giving the companies the right to choose
which system was good for them, but also to convince their respective
companies that the conventional statutory auditor approach was already
satisfactory. As a result, most companies chose the statutory auditor system.
By the end of 2004, only about sixty firms chose the committee system with
independent directors. 247 Tradition was preferred over efficiency, proving
244. See Gilson & Milhaupt, supra note 38, at 353–54. The Ministry of Justice was the
proponent of the abolition of the Statutory Auditor system and its replacement by the U.S.-style
board of committees. Id.
245. Toda & McCarty, supra note 22, at 205.
246. Kaisha Ho [Company Law], Art. 402, Par. 6.
247. By the end of March 2004, the number of companies that switched to the committee
system was 37 firms. If Hitachi Ltd.’s and Nomura Holding’s subsidiaries were added, this would
result to 71 firms in total, with 45 publicly listed companies. This increased to about 60 (from 37)
by the end of 2004. Two years after, the number did not change much. As of late 2006, a total of
76 corporations (from 60) had chosen the committee system. If Hitachi Ltd.’s and Nomura
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that the statutory flexibility by which boards can choose their governance
and monitoring systems did not work well in Japan. However, it must be
remembered that this is Japan, still a highly conservative society where
changes take time.
From the U.S. perspective, the fact that Japanese moguls and business
leaders successfully pushed for a choice of the board system and persuaded
their companies to adhere to the old statutory auditor form may be seen as
unfortunate signs of a static, broken system. But Japan has its own time for
change, unperturbed by how fast the West changes and adapts to its
environs. Even without the U.S.-style committees, Japanese companies
have fared well vis-à-vis North American companies. J-Form/statutory
auditor companies like Toyota have outsold American car manufacturers
since late 2007. 248 Toyota once dominated the cheaper car market in the
1970s and 1980s, then outperformed classic American car companies for
the higher-end market with the Camry model and Lexus line in the 1990s,
and is now again penetrating the lower-end market again with the Echo
(now Yaris). 249 Toyota also fiercely competes in the gas-electric hybrid
market with its Prius. 250 Corporate cultural differences aside, nothing can be
taken away from these great Japanese companies. These incremental, inchby-inch changes are just the way the Japanese have done things for
centuries and will continue to in this new millennium.
The main contention of the old guards is that corporate Japan does not
need independent directors the way American corporations need them. 251
Holding’s affiliates and subsidiaries are included, the total is 110. In 2004, there were almost
700,000 stock companies in Japan. Of this number, as of 2006, there were 2,323 that were listed
with the Tokyo Stock Exchange. Hence, the number of adopting companies is staggeringly low:
from 2004 to 2006, only 16 firms were added to the list. The initial excitement immediately wore
off. However, some of the companies that adopted the committee system were the large ones such
as Sony, Toshiba, Konica Minolta, Orix, Columbia Music Entertainment, Mitsubishi Electric,
Seiyu (a large retail entity controlled by Wal-Mart), Tokyo Star Bank (acquired by Lone Star),
Shinsei Bank, Fidelity Securities and the JASDAQ Securities Exchange. There were two basic
reasons given for why they adopted the committee system: (a) they had large foreign shareholders;
and (b) they were listed in foreign stock exchanges. It may encourage foreign shareholders or
Westerners in general to know that the board is transparent, performs monitoring functions and
adheres to “global best practices.” Other reasons given were that they were global market players
or had strategic motivations. Gilson and Milhaupt asserted that these firms adopted the new
system because they were independent from the traditional patterns of Japanese corporate
behavior as they were either mavericks, new start-ups, had no Main Bank, or were concentrated in
such industries as electronics, finance and retail. See Gilson & Milhaupt, supra note 38, at 356.
248. Nick Bunkley, G.M. Says Toyota Has Lead in Global Sales Race, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24,
2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/24/business/worldbusiness/24auto.html?.
249. Elizabeth Johnson, Toyota Yaris, Conceptcarz.com, http://www.conceptcarz.com/vehicle/
z6942/Toyota-Yaris.aspx (last visited Feb. 20, 2009).
250. New Car Test Drive, Toyota Prius: Introduction, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2009, available at
http://autos.nytimes.com/2008/Toyota/Prius/286/3326/293013/NCTD/researchReviews.aspx.
251. Barney Jopson & David Pilling, U.S. Corporate Governance not Suited to Japan, Says
Ministry, FIN. TIMES, June 21, 2003. See also Toda & McCarty, supra note 22, at 225–26
(discussing how “[t]here is a great deal of opposition to the introduction of outside directors.
Criticism to this system amounts to the question: ‘What do those from the outside know about our
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Certainly, there was the bubble burst and the economic stagnation of the
1990s, but there is no one person or single corporate entity that can be
identified as the cause. For many of the old guards, the independent director
is a liberal American concept that will not work well in insular Japan.
Independent directors are bereft of any understanding or expertise of how
the company works and thus cannot properly supervise it. 252 The antipathy
regarding the presence of independent directors is widespread and the
reforms which began in 2002 are moving at snail’s pace. To select an
independent director is to distrust management and the board, and it
constrains the notion of a company family or community. 253 The concept of
independent directors does not sit well with these corporate old guards since
they generally trust directors and managers. 254 Some are also of the view
that board meetings, in contrast to the U.S. perspective that it is a critical
platform for corporate governance, are a mere “formality . . . just a
festivity,” 255 and utilized only for information dissemination 256 in Japan—
thus, nothing drastic is needed. At best, a choice between the old and new
systems should be provided.
However, one thing these old guards cannot claim is that the scandals
that hit the U.S. in 2001–2002 never had a Japanese counterpart. Corporate

company?’ The main concern is that such board members would not be capable of properly
judging the company’s business practices to make an appropriate decision. . . . One of the
companies that made no changes is Canon Inc. Its President, Mr. Mitarai, strongly defends the
current corporate governance structure. He argues that the existing corporate system under
supervision of its auditors works just fine for Canon. At many U.S. companies what outside
directors actually do is just listen to corporate executives’ explanations about companies, rather
than performing their supposed role of supervising management. This is because they have little
knowledge about day-to-day operations of companies due to part-time status.”). Mr. Mitarai’s
comments were originally derived from U.S.-Style Corporate Governance?, NIKKEI WEEKLY,
June 30, 2003, at 9.
252. Mark Poe, Kay Shimizu & Jeannie Simpson, Revising the Japanese Commercial Code: A
Summary and Evaluation of the Reform Effort, 2 STAN. J. EAST ASIAN AFF. 71, 74 (2002).
Additionally, Gilson and Milhaupt opined that independent directors are not “well suited to
perform a useful role in highly relational Japanese corporate affairs” and that even finding
independent directors suited to the task is daunting. See Gilson & Milhaupt, supra note 38, at 354.
253. See Alison Tudor, Proxy Adviser Targets Japan Inc.: Investors Are Urged to Reject Chief
Executives, Support Independent Directors, WALL ST. J., Feb. 24, 2009, at C2. See also Curtis J.
Milhaupt, Speech & Q&A on his article entitled Choice as Regulatory Reform: The Case of
Japanese
Corporate
Governance
(May
12,
2004)
(transcript
available
at
http://www.rieti.go.jp/en/events/bbl/04051201.html) [hereinafter Milhaupt, Speech].
254. This belief cannot be compared to E. Merrick Dodd’s notion that managers should have
primacy—thus placing extreme trust on directors and officers. This is because, considering the
essential features of the Japanese corporate model, even if they trusted their managers (and not the
shareholders), they still heavily relied upon the monitoring of large stakeholders and even by the
state through the Ministry of Finance’s deployed officials as board members. Dodd did not adhere
to government regulation; corporatist Adolf A. Berle did, as he believed that managers cannot be
fully trusted and must be subject to strict regulation. See generally E. Merrick Dodd, For Whom
Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1932).
255. See LEARMOUNT, supra note 219, at 126.
256. See id.
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governance scandals in Japan are aplenty. 257 These scandals may not
compare in magnitude to Enron or Worldcom (which ushered in the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act), but they have caused grave dishonor to Japanese
companies. Daiwa Bank, due to rogue trader Toshihide Iguchi, lost $1.1
billion on illegal bond trading from 1984 to 1995. 258 Since the 1980s,
Tokyo Electric Power filed at least 29 falsified reports to nuclear-safety
regulators, with these reports failing to include safety problems at eight
nuclear reactors. 259 The Sokaiya have also been responsible for bringing
negative press to Japanese companies by physically harassing directors
during shareholder meetings, exerting extortionist influence, and allegedly
masterminding the killing of corporate leaders. 260 In July 2000, Snow
Brand’s milk caused 14,000 people to get sick after drinking its bacteriacontaminated product. 261 In September 2000, Mitsubishi admitted it
covered up vehicle defects, which resulted in the belated recall of
approximately 600,000 to 800,000 cars and trucks that led to deaths, fires,
accidents and injuries since the 1980s. 262 Some of these scandals came to
light because of the efforts of whistleblowers, leading to the Whistleblowers
Protection Law, passed in 2004. 263 In response to these big scandals, Arthur
M. Mitchell, Asian Development Bank’s General Counsel, stated in 2002
that:
The Japanese corporate scandals over the last ten years too represent a
kind of perversion of the stakeholder model, where management, in the
name of protecting employees and other stakeholders, diverted corporate
assets to pet projects, hid losses in subsidiaries and destroyed corporate
value. . . . [T]he Japanese systems of corporate governance converged into
a kind of managerial capitalism—or capitalism for the benefit of those
who control the corporation. 264

257. See Ahmadjian & Okumura, supra note 16, at 142 (discussing “[s]ubstantial losses at
Sumitomo Corporation and Daiwa Bank due to rogue traders, cover-ups of defects by Mitsubishi
Motors, sales of spoiled milk by Snow Brand, and inadequate maintenance and monitoring of
nuclear power plants by Tokyo Electric Power.”). See also Ruback, supra note 63 at 185, 207.
258. Yamada, supra note 184, at 211.
259. Japanese Corporate Scandals: A Critical Mass of Disgust?, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 5,
2002,
available
at
http://www.economist.com/business/displaystory.cfm?story_id=
E1_TPTRDVG.
260. See Mark D. West, Information, Institutions, and Extortion in Japan and the United States:
Making Sense of Sokaiya Racketeers, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 767, 767–68 (1999).
261. Unfortunately, the head of the factory was merely fined $1,000 and received a two-year
suspended sentence, while the company was fined $4,500 by the Osaka District Court. Anthony
Faiola, New Cover-Up Allegations Hobble Japan’s Fourth-Largest Automaker, WASHINGTON
POST, July 6, 2004, at E01.
262. Id. (“Mitsubishi officials concede that a culture of cover-up existed at the company.”).
263. See Whistleblower Protection Act of 2004, Act No. 122 (2006), available at
http://www.asianlii.org/jp/legis/laws/wpa2004an122o2004371/.
264. Arthur M. Mitchell, What is the Right Model for Corporate Governance in Developing
Asia?, Asian Institute of Management Annual Conference of CEOs, COOs and Directors in Asia
(Manila, June 5–6, 2003), http://www.adb.org/Documents/Speeches/2003/sp2003024.asp.
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The flexibility of choosing between the Japanese statutory auditor
system and the U.S. committee model has been met with open arms by
many Japanese corporate giants that benefit from such flexibility. This
flexible, enabling approach allows them to advertise to the world that, in
law, they have followed the U.S. committee model, but in practice have
chosen the old statutory auditor system by a great majority. This also gives
them the ability to avoid Enron/Worldcom-like scandals. As aptly put by
the Chairman of Fuji Xerox, Yotaro Kobayashi:
The board structure is being changed in a number of Japanese companies,
some are reducing the board size and inviting outside board members. The
direction is right, but I’m not really sure that many of those outside
independent directors are given the freedom that many of the independent
directors have on the boards of [U.S.] corporations. Still, I remain positive
about the outlook. One thing which is unique in Japan is that we have the
company position of statutory auditor; and that’s part of the law. There’s
an argument, a debate as to whether a truly effective audit can be done
either by the statutory auditors or by an audit committee made up by
independent directors, the [U.S.] way. My feeling is that we can probably
combine the two. We will live with the statutory audit system as it is part
of our commercial code, but also we will invite outside board members to
the board so that the board, and, of course, most importantly, the
management can really benefit from the different views. And, if we can
actually combine, that might produce some interesting structure for the
Japanese version of corporate governance. 265

Yet those who clamor for more changes and reforms, such as more
independent directors and increased shareholder returns, have been
chastised as corporate radicals, boardroom bullies, company raiders,
unnecessary “shareholder champion(s),” 266 “financial insurgent(s),” 267 and
“unscrupulous asset stripper(s).” 268 There has been widespread antagonism
toward reformers fueled by negative media coverage and government
prosecution, implying that reformers were Japanese by blood but not by
character. 269
265. Yotaro
Kobayashi,
Japan’s
Changing
Corporate
Structure,
2000
http://www0.gsb.columbia.edu/null/Op45?exclusive=filemgr.download&file_id=592779&showth
umb=0.
266. Kenji Hall, An Activist’s Fall From Grace, BUS. WK., June 5, 2006
http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/content/jun2006/gb20060605_562253.htm?campaign_id
=rss_topStories/.
267. Yoshiaki Murakami, BUS. WK., July 8, 2002, http://www.businessweek.com/
magazine/content/02_27/b3790623.htm.
268. Id.
269. In 2005, Livedoor’s CEO Takafumi Horie was championed by some as the first Japanese
homegrown shareholder activist. Although his actions were not traditionally Japanese, he
espoused the enhancement of shareholder value. He was, however, arrested and indicted in
January 2006 on allegations of accounting fraud and stock market manipulation. In March 2007,
the Tokyo District Court sentenced him to two and a half years imprisonment. Hisane Masaki, The

2009]

Board Reforms with a Japanese Twist

363

Despite the weak definition of independent directors and the fact that
most firms choose tradition over reform, not all firms have rejected reform.
Some firms, particularly those with strong foreign shareholdings, have
introduced independent directors. 270 Firms that chose the statutory auditor
system have made moves to make them more independent and not beholden
to the company president or chief executive. 271 For example, Sony reduced
its top-heavy board by decreasing directors from thirty-eight to just ten in
1997, long before the 2002 amendment. 272 The twenty-eight former
directors were not terminated by the company but were transformed into
“executive officers,” a unique Sony creation in 1997. 273 They were formerly
the directors in charge of managing subsidiaries. By 2003, Sony chose the
committee system with a corporate executive officer system or Shikko-yaku,
further establishing itself as the leading Japanese institution closely
following the U.S. corporate governance model. 274 As of May 2001, 38% of
first-section firms listed in the Tokyo Stock Exchange added outside
directors to their boards. 275 By 2002, about one-third of listed companies
adopted a reduction in board membership, 80% of which “scaled back to
fewer than ten directors.” 276 Though reduction in board size and an increase
in the number of outside directors were the favored governance reforms,
there was no corollary shift to the committee system. Corporate boards,
now reduced and with fewer outsiders, were still dominated by company
insiders.

Fall of a Japanese Business Iconoclast, ASIA TIMES ONLINE, Mar. 17, 2007, available at
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/IC17Dh01.html. Another homegrown activist, Yoshiaki
Murakami, CEO of Murakami Fund, a highly confrontational investment fund, was making
headlines for attempting to take over large, well-established corporations. In June 2006, Murakami
was arrested on allegations of a series of insider trading scandals. In July 2007, just a few months
after Horie’s sentencing, the Tokyo District Court fined Murakami 3 million yen, sentenced him
to two years of incarceration, and additionally seized 1.15 billion yen. See Japan Fund Manager
Found Guilty, BBC NEWS, July 19, 2007, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/
hi/business/6905780.stm; but see Livedoor Manager Spared Jail, STRAITS TIMES ONLINE, Feb. 3,
2009,
http://www.straitstimes.com/Breaking%2BNews/Asia/Story/STIStory_333744.html
(discussing the Tokyo High Court’s decision to suspend Murakami’s two-year prison sentence
while upholding the 1.15 billion yen fine).
270. Some reputable large companies such as Hoya Corp., Square Co., Densei-Lambda KK and
Seiyo Food Systems Inc. have boards comprised of more than one half of outsiders; Kinki Nippon
Railway Co., SSP Co. and five other companies have appointed more than five outside directors.
See Poe, Shimizu & Simpson, supra note 252, at 84.
271. Japan Corporate Auditors Association, The Corporate Auditor System in Japan, Mar. 11,
2007, http://www.kansa.or.jp/english/about_02.html. See also Metzger et al., supra note 227.
272. See Milhaupt, Creative Norm Destruction, supra note 90, at 2117.
273. See id.
274. See Senechal, supra note 32, at 554–55.
275. See MILHAUPT & WEST, supra note 102, at 195.
276. Id.
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VIII. INSIDE, INDEPENDENT AND GREY DIRECTORS
Despite the evolution of Japanese corporate boards and increasing
application of Delaware-style governance structures, grey directors are still
prevalent in Japan. As mentioned previously, Japanese corporate boards are
composed of inside, independent and grey directors, differing significantly
from U.S. practice. An inside director is an employee or officer of the
company, or an officer of an affiliate company or subsidiary. 277 In contrast,
an independent director is someone who is not an inside director and who,
at least conceptually, enforces the regulations set by government, monitors
compliance of the company, and sets clear goals for the company. 278
Independent directors provide the functions of highly staffed regulatory
agencies, but they are cheaper and have less agency costs. 279 Independent
directors do not have a real stake in the company, and if the situation calls
for it, perform a monitoring role and criticize the performance of the CEO,
the management or the entire board. They are the monitors and watchdogs
of the board and the agents of stewardship. Their presence is needed in all
of the committees and their approval or confirmation may cleanse an
otherwise self-dealing transaction.
The Japanese practice regarding independent directors (or the option to
introduce independent directors into the board) can be sharply juxtaposed
with the ideal corporate board described by Martin Lipton and Jay Lorsch
in 1992. 280 According to Lipton and Lorsch, the maximum board should be
ten members, but the ideal is eight or nine members, with the CEO as the
only insider on the board. 281 Though many Japanese companies have
reduced their overpopulated boards to around ten directors, most of them
are still comprised of insiders. 282 Lipton and Lorsch also proposed that the
ideal board should have term limits and that the maximum number of
boards that directors can serve on is three (to ensure valuable
performance). 283 As of now, there are no term limits 284 nor is there a ceiling
277. See generally Cheryl L. Wade, What Independent Directors Should Expect from Inside
Directors: Smith v. Van Gorkom as a Guide to Intra-Firm Governance, 45 WASHBURN L.J. 367
(2006).
278. See generally Victor Brudney, The Independent Director – Heavenly City or Potemkin
Village?, 95 HARV. L. REV. 597 (1982).
279. Gordon, supra note 189, at 1476 (“Large public firms have moved to a pattern of one,
perhaps two, inside directors and an increasing number of independent directors. Some academics
and practitioners have characterized the emerging pattern as the cynosure of corporate governance
because of its maximum control of managerial agency costs.”).
280. See generally Lipton & Lorsch, supra note 179.
281. Id. at 67. For the National Association of Corporate Directors, the ideal board size is
between eight to eleven directors. See Roger Raber, Corporate Governance in the Global
Economy: Roles and Responsibilities of Corporate Directors, RIETI, July 26, 2006,
http://www.rieti.go.jp/en/events/bbl/06072601.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2009).
282. RALF BEBENROTH & LI DONGHAO, PERFORMANCE IMPACT AT THE BOARD LEVEL:
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN JAPAN 24 (Nov. 2006), http://www.bebenroth.eu/Downloads/
BoardroomBebenrothLi.pdf.
283. Lipton & Lorsch, supra note 179, at 69.
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on the number of boards that directors can serve on in Japan. Lipton and
Lorsch similarly advocated for a Lead (Independent) Director who would
counterbalance the power and authority of the CEO. 285 Japanese companies
have been unable to install true independent directors on their boards 286 and
thus obtaining a majority of independent directors or a lead independent
director is unlikely. However, Lipton and Lorsch’s idea of three important
board committees (Audit, Nominating, Compensation) 287 is already a reality
in Japan; the problem is that it is merely a choice between the U.S.-style
committee system or the old, static statutory auditor system. As stated by
Japanese Professor Kenichi Osugi:
[M]ost directors of Japanese companies are also officers of the same
company, which is quite different from American and British companies.
Independent, non-executive directors are uncommon, although Japanese
company auditors could be seen as a type of non-executive director.
Nearly a half of listed companies adopt outside directors, but most of them
still come from another company in the same corporate group. Such
outside directors are not considered independent enough from the
executives of the company to make fair judgment when a control contest
occurs. 288

Lipton and Lorsch likewise envisioned that there ought to be a
minimum time commitment for board members. 289 They argued that there
284. Only the length of each term is specified but not the number of times a director can be
reelected. Kaisha Ho [Company Act], Act No. 86 of 2005, article 332 (Directors’ Terms of
Office).
285. Lipton & Lorsch, supra note 179, at 70–71.
286. ULRIKE SCHAEDE & WILLIAM W. GRIMES, JAPAN’S MANAGED GLOBALIZATION:
ADAPTING TO THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 216 (2003).
287. See Lipton & Lorsch, supra note 179, at 68–69.
288. See Osugi, supra note 173, at 154. See also Gilson & Milhaupt, supra note 38, at 349
(stating “it is safe to assume that a significant percentage of these new outside directors are not
truly independent of the firms on whose boards they serve.”).
289. Lipton & Lorsch, supra note 179, at 64–65. In 2006, fourteen years after publication,
Martin Lipton complained, inter alia, in a memorandum written on November 1, 2006, (1) the
three committees were turning into individualized fiefdoms; (2) the CEO was excluded from
committee meetings; (3) public pension funds demanded meetings with independent directors; (4)
the definition of “independence” was narrowing; (5) time demands on directors were increasing;
(6) CEO or business people were limited to just one outside board, if any; (7) extensive
questionnaires were needed to determine potential conflict of interests or independence; (8) the
number of outside advisors was increasing; and (9) special investigation committees composed of
independent directors were proliferating. These recent complaints, though rational and relevant,
seem to be at odds with his and Lorsch’s proposals back in 1992. Were they not the ones who
proposed most of them? Back in 1992, they advocated for (a) the formation of these three
committees with independent directors; (b) the non-interference of the CEO to preserve
independence; (c) the necessity for directors and officers to “meet annually in an informal setting
with five to ten of the larger investors in the company . . . to promote understanding between the
two groups and provide a convenient and informal opportunity for the investors to tell the
directors . . . any concerns the investors have” otherwise known as the “annual meeting with large
investors” proposal; (d) the importance of director independence; (e) the need for more director
time spent on corporate affairs; (f) limitation to just three outside boards for proper focus and due
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should be at least eight to twelve board meetings a year, and the board
should regularly and formally break into committees entirely composed of
independent directors, have comprehensive full-board sessions, and at least
one day of preparation before each board or committee session. 290 There
should also be annual three-day strategy meetings. 291 In all, directors should
spend at least 100 meaningful hours per year for board service. 292 In
contrast, research shows that Japanese plenary boards infrequently meet. 293
The Company Act of 2005 requires that the board meet only once every
three months. 294 However, the Senior Executive Committee of the board
(Jomu-kai) meets very regularly and typically exceeds the monthly
suggestion of Lipton and Lorsch as they may meet twice monthly or even
weekly. 295 Directors of keiretsu companies also meet twice a year for a few
days in a hotel (most likely owned by a keiretsu member) where they
discuss general corporate matters and socialize. 296 Some keiretsu company
directors may meet more often, such as the monthly First Friday meetings
(Kinyokai) of the Presidents’ Club (Shacho Club). 297 Corporate meetings,
like Japanese academic meetings, are long, dreary and exhausting. Even
with frequent meetings, there is a lot to be done legislatively and culturally
if the plenary board is to perform a monitoring role.
If measured against Delaware corporation law standards, the Japanese
definition of “independent” director pales in comparison. A famous
Delaware case, Orman v. Cullman, 298 provides the best explanation of what
independence means. In Orman, it was critical to determine whether a
majority of the board was interested, conflicted and thus not independent. In
determining whether the board was independent, the court said that such a
determination:
[I]nvolves an inquiry into whether the director’s decision resulted from
that director being controlled by another. . . . [I]f in fact he is dominated
to time constraints; and (g) selection of a Lead Independent Director to counterbalance CEO
power. Now, Martin Lipton is complaining about some of the things he himself was proposing in
1992. Though times have changed, Enron and Worldcom occurred, and Sarbanes-Oxley was
passed, there seems to be some oddity to this. See Martin Lipton, Deconstructing American
Business II, 10 Nat’l Legal Center for Pub. Int. 1, 2–6 (2006), available at
http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.26666/pub_detail.asp.
290. Lipton & Lorsch, supra note 179, at 68–69.
291. Id. at 69.
292. Id.
293. OHTSU & IMANARI, supra note 205, at 353.
294. Kaisha Ho [Company Act], Act No. 86 of 2005, art. 363, no. 2 (Authority of Directors of
Companies with Board of Directors).
295. See OHTSU & IMANARI, supra note 205, at 350, 353.
296. See LEARMOUNT, supra note 219, at 143.
297. See generally MIN CHEN, ASIAN MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS: CHINESE, JAPANESE AND
KOREAN STYLES OF BUSINESS (2004). See also Brian Bremner, Emily Thornton & Irene M.
Kunii, Mitsubishi: Fall of a Keiretsu (Int’l Edition), BUS. WK., Mar. 15, 1999,
http://www.businessweek.com/1999/99_11/ b3620009.htm.
298. Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.2d 5 (Del. Ch. 2002).
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by that other party, whether through close personal or familial relationship
or through force of will. A director can also be controlled by another if the
challenged director is beholden to the allegedly controlling entity. A
director may be considered beholden to (and thus controlled by) another
when the allegedly controlling entity has the unilateral power . . . to decide
whether the challenged director continues to receive a benefit, financial or
otherwise, upon which the challenged director is so dependent or is of
such subjective material importance to him that the threatened loss of that
benefit might create a reason to question whether the controlled director is
able to consider the corporate merits of the challenged transaction
objectively. 299

Japanese inside directors (and grey directors) are definitely not
independent, as they are dominated by the appointing authority. They are
current employees or subsidiary companies’ officers who can immediately
be fired and whose benefits may be reduced at the discretion of the
president of the company. 300 The president can also choose not to reappoint
them the following year (with shareholder “confirmation”). 301 While some
may view Japanese directors’ objectivity as suspect, others argue that such
objectivity does not exist at all. 302 Japanese directors are loyal senior
executive officers before appointment, and are still employees after
appointment to the board. 303 Board members are not inclined to bite the
hand that feeds them and are culturally bound to return the favor by
unwavering fealty and blind allegiance. 304 It would be unconditionally unJapanese to dissent from or contradict the opinion of management.
Grey directors are also typically dominated by and beholden to the
company president. Grey directors include “former officers or employees,
relatives of management, professional advisors to the firm (e.g. consultants,
bank officers, legal counsel), officers of significant suppliers or customers
of the firm, and interlocking directors” 305 and are “closely aligned with [the

299. Id. at 25 n.50 (emphasis removed).
300. Ryuichi Yamakawa, New Wine in Old Bottles?: Employee/Independent Contractor

Distinction Under Japanese Labor Law, 21 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 99, 113–15 (1999) (“In
Japan, however, corporate directors quite often work as employees under the direction and
supervision of top management, such as the company president or chairperson. In many cases,
directors concurrently hold positions as employees (their business card may read, for example,
“Director/Head of Sales Department,” if literally translated). Since not many directors are
appointed from outside of a corporation, it is quite common that managerial employees get
promoted to a directorship while continuing to hold the status of employee.”).
301. OHTSU & IMANARI, supra note 205, at 359.
302. See generally Laura Lin, The Effectiveness of Outside Directors as a Corporate
Governance Mechanism: Theories and Evidence, 90 NW. U.L. REV. 898, 919–20 (1996).
303. Toda & McCarty, supra note 22, at 205.
304. Id.
305. Joseph V. Carcello & Terry L. Neal, Audit Committee Characteristics and Auditor
Reporting 1 n.2 (University of Tennessee, Working Paper, July 1997), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=53917.
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interests] of management.” 306 They often have some unwritten or latent
investments and vested interests in the company. Therefore, grey directors,
neither clearly independent or insiders, incline towards being insiders. As
they have ties with management, they generally do not go against the
wishes of the president or other offices lest they risk ruining their longrunning business relationships. They are not considered explicitly as
insiders as they are not present or past employees of the corporation or any
of its subsidiaries. However, they are absolutely dependent on pleasing
management due to obligations made through their business dealings or
familial relationships. 307
Accordingly, a majority of the Japanese directors could be classified as
either insiders or grey directors. They are grey directors if they are: (a)
directors sent by the Main Bank; (b) directors sent by suppliers, customers
or business partners; (c) directors sent by the parent company; (d) statutory
auditors; (e) consultants or external legal counsels; (f) former employees;
(g) managers’ relatives; or (h) amakudari (both retired and soon-to-retire
Ministry officials). While it can be argued that the amakudari are
independent directors because they are not strictly grey and are employed,
or were once employed, by the state, their agenda is typically centered
around trying to secure an officer position for post-retirement, and thus they
are unlikely to challenge management.
Even with the institution of the committee system and the option to
implement that system, the dilution of “independent” directors weakens the
committee model. However, grey directors are not categorically bad for the
Japanese corporation. An empirical study of the impact of the committee
system through interviews with Japanese lawyers, auditors, ratings analysts,
bankers and institutional investors reveals that outsiders are in fact almost
always grey directors, and are rarely independent. 308 The general
conclusions reached by the study are five-fold: (1) most of the outsider
directors are not independent; (2) it is extremely difficult to find a truly
independent director in Japan; (3) outside directors do not improve
monitoring; 309 (4) the distinctions between, and the advantages of, the
committee system over the statutory auditor approach have been severely
blurred in practice; and (5) as an exception, companies adopting the
committee system that have listed with foreign exchanges or seek foreign
investment may be valued higher by the market 310 due to the familiarity of
306. Id.
307. Amy J. Hillman, Albert A. Cannella, Jr. & Ramona L. Paetzold, The Resource Dependence

Role of Corporate Directors: Strategic Adaptation of Board Composition in Response to
Environmental Change, in THEORIES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: THE PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 139 (Thomas Clarke ed., 2004).
308. See Lawley, supra note 202, at 122–134.
309. See Miwa, Corporate Social Responsibility, supra note 188, at 1242.
310. This higher valuation is due to “the illusion of stronger governance.” Lawley, supra note
202, at 133.
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U.S. and U.K. firms with the committee and monitoring systems. 311
Auditors in the empirical study were also more cautious when auditing
firms with grey outside directors. 312
Because of their stake in the company, grey directors may actually be
more incentivized to police management than independents. 313 Main Banks,
for one, have successfully monitored companies effectively before and have
intervened to remove underperforming CEOs and senior management 314
who threatened the company and the keiretsu structure in general. 315
However, though grey directors may have the incentive to monitor, it is still
likely their interests are aligned with management. Independent monitoring
may be more of the exception than the rule for grey directors. They are
monitoring only to ensure their money is protected and for sound
investment purposes, not because they are selected as professional monitors
or equipped to serve as independent directors. Moreover, the danger with a
grey Japanese director is that he has chameleon abilities—one will never
know if he is white (siding with management) or black (siding with the
monitors). The director can shift colors to avoid detection by the company
president or active shareholders, or simply for convenience just as fast as he
is appointed to the board.
Nevertheless, it is difficult to imagine Japan without its insiders and
grey directors. They are a significant part of the corporate culture and
eliminating them or minimizing their presence to reflect the U.S.’s 1-to-9
ratio of insiders-to-independents seems impossible. 316 They have been
instrumental to Japan’s immense success. The government will not support
such reform, the boards will certainly reject it, and the public at large will
find it unreasonable.
Becoming a mirror image of the U.S. corporate governance model has
never been part of the Japanese agenda. Neither has entirely revamping
corporate governance structures just to please U.S. and U.K.
shareholders. 317 This should not come as a surprise because foreigners have
311.
312.
313.
314.

Id. at 122–34.
Id. at 126.
Id. at 116.
See generally Kaplan, supra note 41. See also Justin Wood, Director Duties and Creditor
Protections in the Zone of Insolvency: A Comparison of the United States, Germany, and Japan,
26 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 139, 159 (2007).
315. Coffee, Jr., supra note 217, at 1300 (“Because the main bank holds an ownership level that
is below five percent by definition, it must secure the consent of its fellow keiretsu members
before it can take disciplinary action or remove senior management. Yet these other members
share a common interest in restricting main bank interventions in the internal affairs of each
member to occasions in which the demonstrated delinquency of a member firm threatens the
keiretsu as a whole.”).
316. See Tudor, supra note 253, at C2.
317. In fact, instead of totally borrowing Western ideas, they are spun into Japanese-style
practice. Companies may even “borrow” an American physically and place him as an insider in
one of their boards. American Jim Press, the first non-Japanese head of Toyota Motors North
America, became the first non-Japanese director at Toyota. As a concurrent employee of the
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never been completely accepted in Japan. Their ideas have in general been
regarded with suspicion and distrust, with some notable exceptions such as
Japan’s embrace of the propositions of German professor Hermann Roesler
in the 1870s. Thus, Japan will take slow, small, measured steps towards
reforming the J-Form and its governance style. The Japanese will likely
avoid appearing as if they are chasing the American form. As a
consequence, any absolutely independent director hoping to institute change
will face a steep climb, and the establishment of a truly independent board
may still be decades in the making.
IX. SWEEPING OR CREEPING CHANGE?
Despite resistance, things are gradually changing in the corporate
landscape. The Company Community, with all of its unique features, is
slowly ebbing away. Furthermore, Japanese CEOs are increasingly reaching
out to, and aligning their interests with, investors and shareholders. 318
Shareholders, according to the 2005 Company Act, can propose that a
director be removed and may actually resolve to remove a director without
cause. 319 Shareholder activism led by homegrown activists, the Osakabased Shareholder Ombudsman, and the institutional investor Pension Fund
Association is gradually being recognized. 320 Foreign hedge funds such as
Steel Partners, Perry Capital and the U.K.’s The Children’s Investment
Fund are beginning to rock the Japanese corporate boat with either their
aggressive or milder approaches to corporate change. 321 Their demands
company, he was an inside director. See Chris Isidore, First American on Toyota’s board,
CNNMONEY,
June
22
2007,
http://money.cnn.com/2007/06/22/news/international/
toyota_american_director/index.htm. However, Mr. Press’s stint as Toyota board member was
short-lived. Just a few months after his appointment, he defected to Chrysler and assumed the
position of President and Board Vice-Chairman. See Dee-Ann Durbin, Top Toyota Exec Jim Press
Joins Chrysler, OAKLAND TRIBUNE, Sept. 7, 2007, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4176/
is_20070907/ai_n19518579.
318. Xu Peng, Latest Development in Corporate Governance, RIETI, June 27, 2007,
http://www.rieti.go.jp/en/projects/cgp/columns/04.html.
319. A shareholder who owns one percent or 300 shares in a company may propose to the
company to remove its directors from office. Kaisha Ho [Company Act], Act No. 86 of 2005, art.
305, no. 1. The shareholders may likewise resolve to remove a director by majority vote without
cause. Kaisha Ho [Company Act], Act No. 86 of 2005, art. 339, no. 1; Kaisha Ho [Company Act],
Act No. 86 of 2005, art. 309, no. 1.
320. Zenichi Shishido states, however, that outside shareholders (such as foreign, institutional
and unaffiliated domestic shareholders) do not and cannot monitor management, and that the only
recourse for them in case of disagreement is “by exit” or by selling their shares. See Shishido,
Japanese Corporate Governance, supra note 9, at 189, 205, 206, 208, 216. But this does not
reflect contemporary corporate Japan since shareholder activism has been on the rise for the last
few years, a gradual strengthening of institutional investors has emerged, and the occurrence of
occasional confrontation with management in lieu of merely selling.
321. Sunrise? Japan is a Cornucopia of Great Business Names and is full of Promise in Terms
of Mergers and Acquisitions. Yet, Japan also has a Habit of Disappointing. Could this be About to
Change?, ACQUISITIONS MONTHLY, July 1, 2008, http://goliath.ecnext.com/coms2/gi_01998145072/Sunrise-Japan-is-a-cornucopia.html#abstract.
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include more transparency, payment of larger dividends, appointment of
more independent directors, and the “promot[ion] and unlock[ing of]
shareholder value through effective corporate governance.” 322
Recently, corporations have come to understand that shareholders are
an important constituency. However, they still have not embraced
shareholder primacy altogether. The stakeholder-centered model, with the
Company Community as a backdrop, is still the general philosophy adopted
by corporations around Japan, with shareholder value merely as one of
many objectives. However, instead of being the last in line on the
stakeholders list, shareholder value has been promoted to a status equal or
near to employees and customers. 323
Japan unquestionably has a long way to go to incorporate shareholder
primacy. As Professor Osugi argues, Japanese corporations are generally
ambivalent about shareholder primacy and seldom entertain the idea of
adding more independent directors. 324 In agreement, Ronald J. Gilson and
Curtis J. Milhaupt argue that Japan has merely imported U.S. corporate
governance principles but has either failed to institute or does not have the
much-needed resources to complement them. 325 They believe that Japan’s
“Americanized” board committee system is a formal—but not a
functional—convergence. 326 It is formal because Japan has imported the
concepts of outside directors, board committees, and accountability
principles, but does not have the complementary mechanisms and systems
to make sure that these Anglo-American governance precepts are
functional. 327
American corporate governance forms have failed to reach full potential
in Japan for three reasons. First, in Japan the full board has only ministerial
and rubber-stamping functions, not genuine monitoring and supervisory
authority. Second, there is no strong judicial review of board actions in
Japan. This is unlike in the United States, especially Delaware, where
boards are generally given deference to perform their functions even to the
point of “expropriation of minority shareholder wealth” as long as
independent directors (or committees) made the decision or it was an arms’
length transaction, in good faith and using good governance practices. 328 If
the board has not done so, then U.S. courts, such as the Delaware Chancery
322. Subodh Mishra & John Taylor, Investors Focus on Pills, Pay Disclosure as Japan’s Proxy
Season Begins, June 15, 2006, http://blog.riskmetrics.com/2006/06/investors_focus_on_pills_
pay_d.html.
323. See generally LEARMOUNT, supra note 219, at 125.
324. See Osugi, supra note 173, at 158.
325. See Gilson & Milhaupt, supra note 38, at 369.
326. Id. at 373.
327. Id. at 369. See also Ronald J. Gilson, Globalization of Corporate Governance:
Convergence of Form or Function, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 329, 331 (2001).
328. See Gilson & Milhaupt, supra note 38, at 345, 370; see also, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP,
Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
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Court, will typically come down hard on the directors and rule against the
validity of the board decision. 329 If, however, the board was fully informed,
reached the decision in good faith, and were not interested in the
transaction, then U.S. courts will not usually disturb it under the Business
Judgment Rule presumption. 330 In Japan, courts may expeditiously agree
that a board decision is valid simply because it was made by an “outside
committee” without investigating whether it was truly independent. 331
Third, Japan does not have a body of jurisprudence and doctrine that will
ably support the transplanted three-committee/independent director
system. 332 More time and more experience with handling litigation or issues
in regards to director independence will be needed.
Shareholders in Japan are gradually having a voice in the company. In
the past, shareholders “either felt it was rude to question management or
lacked an appropriate platform to do so.” 333 However, with the changing
times, “[s]uch deference is becoming a thing of the past.” 334 Shareholders
are slowly transforming into empowered stakeholders who are demanding
not only the right to be heard, but also change. Culture and endogeneity will
play large roles in this era of change. Gilson and Milhaupt believed that
culture, perhaps, plays too big of a role in the field of corporate governance
and may very well hinder the necessary evolution of corporate laws and
practice in Japan. 335 Many hardliners still inhabit the corporate boardrooms
and the government is still run conservatively. Nevertheless, Japanese
culture can adapt to global corporate changes, if not gradually at first.
What is happening is a hybridization of the post-war corporate
governance structure with the U.S.-style model. Pragmatically, an
increasing minority of Japanese boards will be reduced to ten-member
boards in the years to come. The ebbing concept of the Company
Community will be retained generally, but the shareholder will be further
329. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) (“The rule itself ‘is a presumption
that in making a business decision, the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in
good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company.’
. . . Thus, the party attacking a board decision as uninformed must rebut the presumption that its
business judgment was an informed one.”).
330. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (A court will not substitute its own
notions of what is or is not sound business judgment since the Business Judgment Rule “is a
presumption that in making a business decision, the directors of a corporation acted on an
informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests
of the company.”).
331. See Milhaupt, Speech, supra note 253.
332. See Gilson & Milhaupt, supra note 38, at 369–71.
333. William Pesek, Jr., Barbarians Edging Closer to Japan’s Gates, BLOOMBERG, Jan. 27,
2004.
334. Id.
335. See Gilson & Milhaupt, supra note 38, at 361–63. These authors themselves believe that
Japan is “slow to change but capable of enormous change once engaged” and that, following
Newton’s First Law of Motion, its corporate governance tends to remain at rest unless compelled
to change. Id. at 345–46.
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promoted as one of the most important stakeholders. This will be pursued
by the hedge funds and institutional activists currently investing in Japan, as
well as the entry of newer homegrown shareholder activists such as
Murakami and Horie. Reformists will push for more independent board
membership, and they will be able to reach three or four independents out
of ten directors in the coming years. There will be a further decrease in the
number of insiders, notably managers, as corporate leaders realize that
bestowing directorship as the “grand prize” to fiercely loyal employees is
not always rewarding. This will allow many boards to be stripped of their
operating functions and to take on a monitoring role. The weak statutory
auditor paradigm will be strengthened to hopefully match that of the U.S.style audit committee composed of independents (unless the company has
already chosen the committee system). Instead of focusing solely on
growth, companies will also focus on profitability and shareholder return
through dividends. As shareholders grow bolder and as more New York law
firms enter and entrench themselves in Tokyo, it can be expected that there
will be more shareholder resolutions and proposals, more mergers and
acquisitions, and more shareholder litigation.
Independent directors will have a rough time at first. They are expected
to bow to the company president and the first few batches of independents
will likely do so until they increase their numbers. In time, real
independents, despite being in the minority, 336 will have the courage to
constructively question and thus properly monitor the heavy hand of
management. They will be able to say no, inter alia, if the executives are
procuring excessive wealth from the company. It is almost certain that there
will not be an independent board for at least fifteen to twenty years.
However, once China dislodges Germany and eventually overtakes Japan in
terms of the size of its economy, and large Japanese corporate brands begin
to see lower incomes and profitability, then Japan may finally open up to
the concept of a fully independent board. When that happens, they will
determine that the concept of Company Community is obsolete and
continue their shift to a more Western style of governance. 337
The following list summarizes what may be attainable in the next
decade or so:
336. Perhaps three or four directors, maybe even five, in a ten-man boardroom.
337. One thing is for certain: executive compensation will not generally be a problem for

Japanese corporations. A CEO compensation that is too high or too divorced from the average
sarariman (salary man’s) pay is something the Japanese cannot stomach. With the emotional
attention of American media perennially focused on exorbitant CEO pay, Japanese chief
executives will most certainly stay away from this ruckus for fear of being socially damaged and
professionally ridiculed. See Kenji Hall, No Outcry About CEO Pay in Japan, BUS. WK., Feb. 10,
2009, http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/content/feb2009/gb20090210_949408.htm. See
also Yuka Hayashi & Phred Dvorak, Japanese Wrestle With CEO Pay as They Go Global, WALL
ST. J.,
Nov.
28,
2008,
at
B1,
available
at
http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB122782362228562381.html?mod=todays_us_marketplace.
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(1) Downsizing the bloated board of directors to a maximum of ten
board members for effective governance and decision-making;
(2) Increasing the proportion of independent directors;
a. At least three or four independents with six to seven
insiders and grey directors, with the goal of eventually
obtaining a majority of independent directors; 338 and
b. Doing so gradually, as immediately and drastically
reducing or eliminating insiders and grey directors will not
work culturally, legally and pragmatically;
(3) Increasing boldness of and monitoring by independent directors,
peculiarly versus the President’s authority; 339
(4) Increasing the length and comprehensiveness of board meetings
(not a rubber-stamp board);
(5) Holding roughly ten to twelve board meetings per year; 340
(6) Strengthening the statutory auditor by making it truly independent:
a. More active involvement during board meetings and
arming statutory auditors with voting rights;
b. Introduction of non-statutory corporate executives
(corporate officers) who will deal with day-to-day priorities
of the corporation; 341
c. Providing statutory auditors with their own staff, budget
and outside professional assistance;
d. A stricter definition of independent statutory auditor; and
e. The requirement of at least three statutory auditors for
larger corporations, with all of them being independent;
(7) Strengthening of the Committee System:
a. Creating clear distinctions between the committees in terms
of functions;

338. In 2003, about one-third of sampled Japanese companies had appointed outside directors to
their boards. See BEBENROTH & DONGHAO, supra note 282, at 25. This meant one or two outside
directors for a 10-man board if they also chose to reduce the board’s members. This is bound to
increase in the coming years. In contrast, in 2005, a survey of the largest public companies in the
United States, uncovered that 81% of companies had boards comprised of at least 75%
independents. ABIGAIL ARMS, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRACTICES OF THE 100 LARGEST U.S.
PUBLIC COMPANIES, IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 2005: DEALING WITH THE GOVERNANCE &
DISCLOSURE CHALLENGES AHEAD 3 (Practising Law Inst. Handbook, No. 6273, 2004),
http://www.pli.edu/emktg/compliance_coun/Corp_Gov10a.pdf.
339. Company presidents in general have the exclusive authority to appoint and dismiss
executives and even directors. See Poe, Shimizu & Simpson, supra note 252, at 85.
340. The law requires that the board meet at least quarterly. NEW JAPAN CORPORATIONS LAW,
http://www.japanlaw.info/japancommercialcode/NEWCOMPANIESLAW.html.
In
some
companies, however, the plenary board meets once a month but the board’s Senior Executive
Committee or Jomu-kai meets twice a month or more.
341. This is intended to organizationally segregate the board from management so as to
distinctly clarify the role of the directors and the managers. See Poe, Shimizu & Simpson, supra
note 252, at 85. Moreover, the 2002 amendment allows for this.
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b. Establishment of the Audit, Appointment and
Remuneration committees composed solely of independent
directors;
c. Increasing adoption by companies to 250–350 listed
companies; and
d. Correction of the weak and loose definition of
independent/outside directors;
(8) Creating a clear dichotomy between operations/management and
supervision/monitoring;
(9) Increasing openness of boards to shareholder activism of
individuals and institutions (e.g. the Pension Fund Association),
and to ordinary shareholder proposals, dialogues and resolutions:
a. Elimination of Shan-Shan shareholder meetings in which
managers deliberately assign employees to clap as long and
as hard as they can whenever a shareholder raises a
proposal or to support management; 342
b. Full eradication of the Sokaiya (corporate gangsters)
menace; and
c. Movement towards and cultural openness to a shareholderoriented model; 343
(10) Systematic diminution of the cross-shareholding system since “the
rate of cross-shareholding has been slightly increasing;” 344
(11) Full implementation of the 2005 Company Law (Kaisha Ho);
(12) Increasing board openness to takeovers attempts, whether hostile
or friendly;
(13) Appointment of more foreigners (like Carlos Ghosn) to top
positions; 345 and
(14) Increasing director pay to the level of the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development. 346
X. CONCLUSION
The Japanese board is unlikely to reflect the U.S. board model anytime
soon. The Americanization of Japan is unpopular amongst Japan’s older
citizens, likely forestalling such a movement. 347 However, the hybrid
corporate governance form—particularly the reworked board of directors—
342. See LEARMOUNT, supra note 219, at 134 (“When the chairman announces the agenda, the
employees clap and shout ‘we agree,’ so the chairman usually says that the agenda is carried – I
think probably 70 percent of Japanese companies are still like this” in 2002.).
343. Suzuki, supra note 110, at 820.
344. See Osugi, supra note 173, at 161.
345. Miki Tanakawa, Imitating Mr. Ghosn in Japan, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2001, §3, at 2.
346. To give Japanese directors more skin in the game; at the same time to serve as incentive to
be informed, more responsive to shareholder concerns, and more professional in their approach.
See generally Ira Millstein, The Professional Board, 50 BUS. LAW 1427 (1995).
347. See Hall, supra note 337.
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will be reflective of many of the features of the U.S. model while still
retaining some of the qualities of the post-war model. In that way, it will
have a Japanese twist.
A few years ago, it was feared that barbarians (a.k.a. reformists) were
edging ever closer to Japan’s gates. It is too late: the barbarians are already
operating within the gates, 348 and will open the palace gates for anyone
wishing to enter the imperial grounds. Nevertheless, the barbarians are still
few.
Will more independent and fewer grey directors speed the evolution of
the Japanese board of directors? To a certain extent, yes, but it will take
much greater time and effort for an overhaul to be completed. Impatient
U.S. and U.K. interests may simply move their funds elsewhere or not
invest at all. But in those cases, they will miss out on an excellent
investment opportunity. The Tokyo Stock Exchange is still the second
largest securities exchange in the world in terms of market value, 349 just
behind the New York Stock Exchange. Moreover, it is undeniable that
change for the benefit of shareholders is creeping up in Japan, and it is
taking one careful step at a time. Are real changes forthcoming? Time and
experience will be the ultimate judges. For now, changes lie somewhere
between cosmetic reform and real reform. The corporate governance facade
is being altered but it is still uncertain how deep the changes will go and if
the corporate decision-makers will follow them.
As aptly written by a renowned Japanologist, “[it] seems unlikely that
countries can embrace the shareholder supremacy norm for corporate
activity without wholesale revision of deeply entrenched views and
practices in other areas of society.” 350 Despite recent changes, Japan should
further legislate, implement and adhere to continuing corporate governance
reforms, lest it be viewed that the independent director under the 2005
Company Act is just a mere Potemkin Village.

348. This raises some fears within the Japanese business community, much like how the
Household International board was very fearful and uneasy with Moran not only being one of their
directors but who was then exploring the possibility of a leveraged buy-out of the company by his
D-K-M entity. Moran was a so-called “barbarian” who was not nearing the gates, but was a dulyelected director inside the board. The difference was that the Household International board had a
legitimate fear of an imminent takeover, while the Japanese may just be cautious of foreigners
generally. See Moran v. Household International, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
349. The Tokyo Stock Exchange has a market capitalization of 5 trillion dollars. See Ayny,
Tokyo Stock Exchange: 130 Years of Success, ECOMMERCE JOURNAL, Dec. 11, 2008,
http://www.ecommerce-journal.com/articles/11824_tokyo_stock_exchange_130_years_of_
success.
350. Milhaupt, Creative Norm Destruction, supra note 90, at 2126–27.

